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Abstract 
 
 
How do governing institutions contribute to the construction of good judgment? In this 
dissertation, I begin answering this question by developing a concept of judgment as a 
dynamic, collective process. I then apply this concept to the analysis of two U.S. 
institutions, direct legislation and the judiciary. One implication of this dissertation is that 
mass democratic politics and good judgment are not inherently antagonistic; rather, I 
argue, the capacity of any one institution to generate good judgment depends on its 
relation to other institutions. To assess institutional capacity, I develop a distinct standard 
of judgment, what I call good judgment. I develop this concept of good judgment by 
theorizing justification on both the individual and collective level. I define good 
judgment as the individual and collective adjustment of commitments over time in light 
of one another, privileging no one commitment, or set of commitments. I also argue good 
judgment requires attending to the consequences of commitments: good judgment 
reflexively integrates evidence generated by individual and collective experience. I give 
contextual specificity to this standard of good judgment through my case studies of direct 
legislation and the judiciary. 
 
 1 
 
 
 
Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
How does the structure of governing institutions contribute to the quality of 
judgments these institutions produce? To answer this question, I argue we need a 
dynamic concept of judgment, where judgment is construed as a collective process 
occurring over time. In this dissertation, I develop this dynamic concept, and I apply it to 
the analysis of two American institutions, direct legislation and the judiciary. I conclude 
that the capacity of any one institution to generate good judgment depends on its location 
within a larger system of institutions. This dissertation suggests how some of the burden 
for good judgment might be shifted from individual cognitive capacities to institutional 
design. In doing so, it contributes to debates over the relation between mass democratic 
politics and judgment, and the value of direct legislation and the judiciary. 
I begin developing this dynamic concept of judgment by appealing to the idea of a 
reflective equilibrium. Reflective equilibrium is a theory of justification with origins in 
the philosophy of science, later appropriated by moral and political philosophy. It 
describes the process of justification as the adjustment of value commitments in a 
reflexive process over time, privileging no one commitment or set of commitments, with 
the aim of achieving coherence among commitments. It is helpful for two reasons. One, it 
offers a non-foundationalist account of justification because it does not prioritize among 
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commitments or sets of commitments. Two, it is scalable: it is an account of justification 
at both the individual and collective levels, so it helps us think through the relation 
between processes of individual judgment and collective judgment.  
However, reflective equilibrium, at least in its appropriation by moral philosophy, 
is not an unproblematic concept. In its emphasis on coherence, reflective equilibrium can 
be read as urging convergence on a unitary value system. Reflective equilibrium can also 
be criticized for its abstract, philosophical character: while it helps us understand 
intellectual processes, it seems to have little to say about action, particularly political 
action. And as philosophers of science helpfully remind us, justification is also enhanced 
when commitments are tested in the world. So, I develop a concept of good judgment 
using both reflective equilibrium as well as criticisms of moral philosophy’s 
appropriation. Unlike reflective equilibrium, the standard of good judgment I develop is 
not driven by the aim of convergence. 
I define good judgment as the individual and collective adjustment of 
commitments over time in light of one another, privileging no one commitment, or set of 
commitments. I also argue good judgment requires attending to the consequences of 
commitments: good judgment reflexively integrates evidence generated by individual and 
collective experience. For example, I argue that the judiciary’s particular capacity for 
learning the consequences of legislation, and for incorporating that knowledge into 
revised or new law, contributes to the quality of judgment produced by the system of 
institutions to which it belongs. Because of this emphasis on experience, good judgment 
is not a wholly intellectual exercise. Good judgment is often enhanced by political action. 
For example, we can understand judgment to 
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affected by legislation bring suit. This political action enables the court to exercise an 
epistemic function, as it allows the court to learn the consequences of law. 
I give contextual specificity to this standard of good judgment through two case 
studies of U.S. institutions: direct legislation and the judiciary. I choose direct legislation 
because it is an ideal example to evaluate the claim that mass democracy is antagonistic 
to good judgment. The emphasis on face-to-face deliberation has also made direct 
legislation – which offers no formal, simultaneous deliberative forum – an understudied 
site of judgment. I choose the judiciary for similar reasons. The judiciary is an ideal 
example to break with assumption that insulation from mass politics enhances judgment: 
some might understand the judiciary’s contributions to depend precisely on its supposed 
insulation from mass democratic politics. Also, many democratic theorists (although not 
those who are also legal scholars) understand the judiciary to largely follow law, not 
politics, and to operate independently of other governing institutions; consequently, the 
judiciary is understudied, as it is not viewed as a site for the construction of collective 
judgment.  
Examining these judiciary and direct legislation through the lens of judgment 
construction also offers new ways of understanding these institutions’ authority. Contrary 
to a popular assumption, direct legislation is not an entirely impoverished site for 
judgment. I show, for example, how it is not direct legislation itself, but direct 
legislation’s interactions with electoral campaigns that hinders good judgment. Direct 
legislation’s difficulties with judgment are due to its (contingent) relation to other 
institutions, not because it is an institution of unmediated mass democracy. 
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It is similar with the judiciary: viewing the judiciary through the lens of judgment 
construction offers an alternative understanding of the institution’s authority. Rather than 
evaluating the judiciary in terms of adherence to law passed by elected officials, or in 
rights it does or does not protect – both functions which may depend on the court’s 
insulation from mass democratic politics – we can understand the judiciary as 
contributing to a reflexive process of collective judgment among and between governing 
institutions. The judiciary’s epistemic contributions are a function of both its place in 
interbranch and mass politics, as well as to the particular character of adjudicatory 
processes. For example, because adjudication requires actual controversies, the judiciary 
is particularly suited to uncovering undesired and unanticipated consequences of law, and 
because other institutions respond to (or anticipate) judicial decisions, those undesired 
and unanticipated consequences can be integrated into a collective process of judgment. 
As these examples suggest, my concept of good judgment is not defined in 
reference to any particular set of substantive outcomes. It is a procedural standard, based 
on a particular idea of justification. The idea of a reflective equilibrium was an attempt to 
describe and theorize contemporary understandings of what justification means; in 
appealing to reflective equilibrium, as well as criticisms of it, I intend to do the same. So, 
of course, the standard of good judgment I develop is grounded in a particular view of 
justification, and so a particular set of norms. Much of the normative appeal of a theory 
of justification like reflective equilibrium (and, likewise, the standard of good judgment I 
derive from it) lies in the respect it gives to individuals as moral agents: justification 
occurs not by appeal to existing norms, or to a higher authority, but by asking individuals 
to reflect on their own commitments and those of others, and to participate in the 
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negotiation of the competing and often conflicting demands of moral pluralism. In this 
way, implicit in the standard of good judgment I develop are norms consistent with 
liberal democracy.1  
In this introduction, I explain how this dissertation contributes to debates over the 
evaluation of mass democratic politics and citizen competence, as well as the authority of 
direct legislation and the judiciary. 
 
Mass democratic politics, citizen competence, and judgment 
 
 The belief that mass democratic politics is in tension with, if not outright 
antagonistic to, good judgment has a long history in Western political thought. This 
tension (or antagonism) has been parsed a number of different ways. For example, there 
is a tradition of understanding good judgment as a function of expertise. In Plato’s “The 
Apology,” for instance, we see Socrates comparing the knowledge of the expert horse 
breeder with that of the lay majority; we can read this comparison as part of Socrates’ 
rebuke of Athenian democracy (25b). Or, consider Habermas’s critique of the 
“scientization of politics” (1970). Drawing on Weber’s analysis of rationalization, 
Habermas warns of a future in which the masses’ reliance upon, and trust of, the 
judgment of scientific experts devolves into rule by technocrats (1970, 68). Rather than 
rejecting the judgment of mass democratic politics, as Socrates arguably does, 
Habermas’s analysis is directed at the integration of scientific judgment and public 
judgment. The tradition of understanding judgment as a function of expertise is itself 
                                                
1 For a review of the relation between justification and contemporary liberal theory, see 
Chambers (2010). 
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diverse, and it is but one tradition in a larger history that understands mass democratic 
politics to be in tension with good judgment.  
My entry into this sizeable debate is directed, in part, by recent questions over the 
evaluation of democratic representation. Contemporary mass democratic politics is, 
arguably, the politics of democratic representation. But in light of growing concerns over 
representation’s constitutive character, there has been a rethinking among some theorists 
of how to understand its democratic authority. This rethinking has helped instigate a turn 
to judgment, specifically, the study of judgment’s circulation between and among 
institutions. My approach to mass democratic politics is informed by this turn to examine 
the inter-institutional construction of judgment, as well as concerns over representation’s 
constitutive character. 
These concerns over representation’s constitutive character are directed at the 
criteria long-used to evaluate contemporary democratic institutions: congruence between 
the people’s preferences and policy outcomes. To the degree that governance results in 
median-reverting policy outcomes, this “congruence standard” believes democracy to be 
achieved. The concept of democracy underlying this standard is one of authorization: the 
people authorize representatives to govern in their interests. Several assumptions are at 
work in this concept of democracy: the assumption that people have interests that are 
prior to (or exogenous to) their political relationships with their representatives; the 
assumption that these interests are stable and coherent – in order to evaluate whether 
representatives are acting in the people’s interests, those interests must somehow be 
identifiable; and the assumption that the entity of “the people” is stable, coherent, and 
exists prior to the process of representation.  
 7 
However, some normative and empirical scholars are arguing that processes of 
preference formation and political identity constitution are circular, and not 
unidirectional, as the authorization concept (and the congruence standard) assumes. 
As more scholars consider how the process of political representation might construct the 
preferences it aims to represent, the ideal of “responsiveness to constituency preferences” 
is being increasingly questioned. Instead of seeing interests as existing prior to politics, 
many are now arguing that political processes also shape how people understand their 
interests.  
The assumption that people’s interest are exogenous to political processes has 
been challenged by work in a variety of fields of study, including survey design, political 
psychology, public opinion, Congress, historical institutionalism, and normative political 
theory. Survey researchers have developed a subtle and sophisticated understanding of 
how interviews, questionnaires, and measures shape respondents’ answers and scholars’ 
interpretation of preferences (e.g., Converse and Schuman, 1974; Bouchard, 1976; 
Coverse and Presser, 1986; Rosenstone, Hansen, and Kinder, 1986; Mondak, 2001). 
Studies in political communication show how “frames” construct political viewpoints 
(e.g., Druckman, 2001, 2004).  Political psychologists conceive preferences as 
endogenous to politics (e.g., Bartels, 2003). Some legislative scholars model 
representation as a dynamic, also with endogenous preferences (e.g., Gerber and Jackson, 
1993; Stimson, Mackuen, and Erikson, 1995). Historical institutionalists examine how 
institutions create preferences (e.g. Thelen, 2003; Orren and Skowronek, 2004.). Political 
scientists have begun modeling dynamic models of representation that assume 
preferences are endogenous to the process of representation (e.g., Gerber and Jackson, 
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1993;), and many have replaced preferences with the more complex, multidimensional 
concept of attitudes (on attitudes, see e.g., Bartels, 2003; Druckman, 2001, 2004). 
 Feminist theorists have long suggested that the construct of “women” is created 
by the political process of representing “women.” For example, Young (2000) conceived 
of representation as a process which created a “perspective,” as opposed to the earlier, 
static model, which assumed the prior existence of a group such as women (with scare 
quotes intentionally absent). We can also see this idea of the constitutive character of 
political processes in the post-structuralist tradition, with its operating assumption that 
meaning and coherence only exist insofar that they are created through linguistic and 
social practices over time. That which is represented becomes a contingent “hegemonic 
articulation” (LaClau and Mouffe, 1985); a field of struggle (LaClau, 1996); an “empty 
place” (Lefort, 1988); or, say, in an appeal to aesthetic theory, an always insufficient, 
incomplete “perspective” (Ankersmit, 1996, 2002). These theorists share an agonistic 
view of politics, where any unity created through representation is only apparent unity, 
forged through struggles over power; on this view, democracy is, essentially, the constant 
political recreation of this (false, temporary) unity of “the people.” 
Facing this dynamic, multi-directional character of political processes – what 
Disch has called the “constructivist” turn (2011, 102-3) – a number of theorists have 
argued for the “decentering” of democracy or “indirect” democracy (Habermas, 1996, 
296-307). Democracy, this argument, goes should not be reduced to particular moments 
in formal governing institutions. Democracy is not “one big meeting at the conclusion of 
which decisions are made,” but involves formal and informal exchanges over a range of 
places and times, where “there is no final moment of decision” (Young, 2000, 45).  It is 
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“a circular march that starts from outside the government, reaches political institutions, 
ends temporarily with the vote of the representatives, and returns to society, from where 
it starts its path all over again since the citizens have the right to propose abrogative 
referenda or new laws,” writes Urbinati (describing the model of democracy in 
Condorcet’s proposed constitution, 2006, 202).  
For some, an implication of this decentering has been a shift in emphasis from the 
authorizing, decisionistic will to the circulation and formation of judgment (Disch, 2011; 
Rosanvallon, 2011; Urbinati, 2006). Judgment seems particularly suited to a notion of 
legitimacy that emphasizes intersubjective communication and informal (as well as 
formal) exchanges, and deemphasizes the moment of decision. Furthermore, judgment 
seems particularly suited to the contemporary context, where governing decisions are 
largely made by representatives.  
One way to approach the relation between judgment and legitimacy is by 
conceiving judgment as form of citizen agency. Judgment can be construed as a form of 
spectatorship that gives citizens power, and thus confers democratic authority (Garsten, 
2006, 7; Green, 2009; Urbinati, 2006, 5). For example, Urbinati argues that the political 
judgment of citizens involves the exercise of two types of powers: “positive as activating 
and propositive, and negative as receptive and surveilling” (2006, 5). In Urbinati’s 
judgment-based formulation of democratic representation, the citizen is a constant 
presence in government (2006, e.g., 95-7). She contrasts this model of democratic 
representation with those that truncates citizens’ participation to the decision of selecting 
the officials who will “actually” govern (my quotes, 2006, e.g., 95-7). We can read 
Urbinati as arguing that the autonomy of the representative invites the constant presence 
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of citizens through a supervisory process that involves citizens’ application of their own 
political judgment. Judgment can thus be seen as an important form of citizens’ “active 
doing” (Urbinati, 2006, 5, 3). However, the “constructivist turn” in democratic theorizing 
makes this approach to judgment hard to operationalize: if political processes are 
multidirectional, how would we recognize when a citizen is exercising power through his 
or her “own” political judgment? 
An alternative way to interpret the turn to judgment is through the lens of the 
“constructivist turn.” On this reading, judgment is not, centrally, about the individual 
exercise of agency; instead, judgment is construed as a dynamic, multi-directional, 
collective process in which inter-institutional relationships figure. Consider, for example, 
the constitution of Condorcet, used as a model for a judgment-based politics theorized by 
Urbinati (2006), as well as by Disch (2011) and Rosanvallon (2011). These theorists have 
cited Condorcet’s proposed constitution as an example of how a system of institutions 
can contribute to the collective processes of judgment. For example, his proposed system 
included such features such as the circulation of proposed legislation among dispersed 
citizen assemblies. It is inter-institutional features such as these – as opposed to, say, an 
individual’s ability to differentiate between good and bad representation – on which the 
construction of judgment rests. On this reading, then, the decentering of democracy has 
prompted not only a turn to judgment, but a depersonalization of judgment.  
In the second chapter of this dissertation, I discuss Condorcet’s proposed 
constitution as a model for analyzing how inter-institutional relations contribute to 
collective processes of judgment. However, I depart from previous interpretations by 
reading his proposal for the design of governing institutions in conjunction with his 
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proposal for a national system of public education (he developed these proposals at the 
same time). We might read his proposal for public education as consistent with the turn to 
institutions, as the public is educated via a system of public institutions. It is not, 
however, consistent with the depersonalization of judgment. His system of public 
education was meant to instill in citizens a capacity for critical reasoning and positive 
principals. I read his proposal as intending to give individual citizens the ability to judge 
governance that was in their own interest, and that which was not. In other words, his 
desire to establish a system of education demonstrates a concern with instilling a capacity 
for judgment at the level of the individual.  
Read in light of the constructivist turn, Condorcet’s proposal for education thus 
points to the limits of the design of governing institutions. The study of inter-institutional 
relations offers traction on the question of what the processes of judgment are, but it is 
not clear that it can answer the question of who the agents of those processes are. And 
without an answer to this question of agency, I doubt that the circulation of judgment can 
confer a specifically democratic authority, insofar that we understand democratic 
authority to refer to citizens’ control over decisions of governance. In other words, I do 
not see the inter-institutional construction of judgment as answering the question of 
citizen competence that has been central in the literature of American politics: it does not 
provide an answer to what Lupia and McCubbins call “the democratic dilemma” – the 
question of whether citizens are able to learn the things they need to know in order to 
govern in their own interest (1998). 
That said, even if we do not take this “democratic dilemma” approach, we have 
reasons to care about citizen competence in a democracy. In short, if we bracket the 
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question of whether democracy exists – perhaps because we have other ways of 
evaluating democracy besides citizen competence, like a thriving civil society, and the 
protection of fundamental political rights like voting – then we assume citizens play a 
role in governance, and we want governance to be driven by good judgment. This is the 
approach I take in this dissertation. I do not claim that the institutional construction of 
judgment confers democratic authority, insofar that it compensates for the specifically 
democratic reasons we care about citizen competence. But, I do claim that the 
institutional construction of judgment alleviates some of the concerns we might have over 
good governance in a democracy, particularly in institutions of mass democracy. 
Furthermore, by setting the question of democratic legitimacy aside, we are, I 
suggest, less likely to fall into the trap the constructionist turn warns against – that is, of 
grounding good collective judgment in individual capacity. As those in the constructivist 
turn emphasize, an individual’s judgment at any one moment is very much a function of 
the immediate environment (such as the framing of survey question), as well as the 
larger, long-term environment (such as what frames have appeared in the newspaper over 
the past day, week, and years).  If we are concerned with the “democratic dilemma,” we 
are rightfully concerned with individual capacity. But if we are not concerned with the 
“democratic dilemma,” individual capacity – particularly, the individual’s ability to 
differentiate between “educative” and “manipulative” education – need not be a central 
concern. 
In the second chapter, I develop the distinct standard of collective processes of 
judgment described in the introduction. While this standard of good judgment does not 
evaluate democratic authority, it is nonetheless relevant to democratic theory, as it can be 
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used to evaluate the claim that mass democratic politics are antagonistic to good 
judgment. In my third and fourth chapters, I do just that, and use this standard of good 
judgment to examine how the judiciary and direct legislation influence collective 
processes of judgment. 
 
The judiciary  
From one perspective, the judiciary might seem an unusual institution to turn to 
study collective processes of judgment. Democratic theorists do not generally study the 
judiciary: they tend to take a formal, juridical approach, assuming the judiciary’s 
normative mandate is to follow the rule of the law, not the people.2 Take, for example, 
Hanna Pitkin’s classic work on representation (1967). Although Pitkin (1967) interjects 
brief discussions of judges as representatives at various points, she only does so when 
“confront[ing” the “multiplicity” of types of political representation (1967, 227-8). 
Judges, here, are in the company of monarchs and ambassadors – Pitkin’s point is to 
stress the necessity of specifying the term “political representation” when it is used, as 
some representatives are highly insulated from public opinion (1967, 227-8). Because 
many democratic theorists see the judiciary as largely insulated from mass politics, the 
judiciary is a relatively untapped source for the study of collective processes of judgment. 
Also, the judiciary’s (apparent) insulation from the electorate might lead theorists to see it 
as a check against the excesses of masses democracy, infusing democratic politics with 
                                                
2 An exception to this description of democratic theory is those who also engage in legal 
studies (e.g., Dworkin, 1985). 
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the good judgment of insulated and elite judges, whose obligation is to the law, not the 
people.  
As an institution led by non-elected, life-tenured officials with the power of 
judicial review, the authority of the judiciary in a democratic system has been subject to 
much debate. The legal literature offers three models for conceptualizing the judiciary 
according to democracy theory: the authorizer, the interpreter, and the facilitator models. 
Democratic theory is only occasionally the subject of legal scholars’ work, so these 
models are, in most cases, my interpretive impositions – my argument for how we might 
see three models of democratic legitimacy explicitly or (in most cases) implicitly 
supported in empirical and normative scholarship on the Court.3 Each approach has 
normative and empirical problems. 
The authorizer model. I interpret “the authorizers” as locating the judiciary’s 
democratic legitimacy in its authorization by elected officials. I include in this group 
proponents of the “attitudinal model,” that is, those who claim that judicial decisions are 
primarily a function of judges’ policy preferences (Segal and Spaeth, 2002).4 I also 
include variations on the attitudinal model, such as those who see judges’ attitudes 
shifting along the lines of public opinion, due to “the force of mutually experienced 
                                                
3 The central concern of legal scholars is not typically democratic theory, and therefore 
the democratic character of the judiciary is often alluded to, assumed, or implied.  So, 
while democracy is sometimes a primary concern of legal scholars (Ackerman, 1991; 
Dahl, 1957; Elster, 2000; Ely [1980], 2002; Giles, Blackstone, & Vining, 2008; Graber, 
1993, 2008; Lovell and Lemieux, 2006), it is often a secondary concern (Frymer, 2003, 
2007; Gillman, 2002; Graber, 1998, 2005, 2006; Lovell, 2000, 2003; Pickerill and 
Clayton, 2004; Tushnet, 2006; Whittington, 2007), or, merely, considered relevant (Segal 
and Spaeth, 2002). 
4 Even though Segal and Spaeth (2002, 429) explicitly try to avoid normative theorizing, 
I include them in this list as their prominent model can be legitimized through this 
authorization model, as it is in Giles, Blackstone, & Vining (2008). 
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events and ideas” (Giles, Blackstone, & Vining, 2008), as well as Peretti (1999), who 
construes justices as “indirect” representatives when voting according to their “political 
views, which have been consciously and deliberately sanctioned by elected officials 
competing for political control of the Court through the selection process” (84).5   
I also include in this group the “regimes literature.” This literature emphasizes the 
judiciary’s authorization through the appointment process, but it sees the judiciary as part 
of a larger governing regime (e.g., Dahl, 1957; Gillman, 2002; Frymer, 2003, 2007; 
Graber, 1993, 1998, 2005, 2006, 2008; Lovell, 2000, 2003; Lovell and Lemieux, 2006; 
Pickerill and Clayton, 2004; Whittington, 2007). From the perspective of the regimes 
literature, the judiciary’s democratic character would be grounded in the appointment 
process and in the consistent actions of elected officials who have repeatedly upheld and 
expanded the judiciary’s original powers.6  
I argue that the authorization model is incapable of legitimating these actions of 
the judiciary as democratic. Consider how, typically, democratic authorization works in 
normative theory. In normative theory, democratic authorization is legitimate when those 
who are authorized are strictly bound by the sovereign – Rousseau’s magistrates, for 
                                                
5 This authorization is not the only way Peretti understands the Court to play a 
democratic role.  She turns to the concept of pluralism to legitimate the Court’s role in a 
democracy: “the Court’s role as a redundant institution has value in terms of providing 
groups and values receiving insufficient attention elsewhere to have at least a chance at 
being included and represented in the policymaking process. This, in and of itself, should 
contribute over time to a broader consensus, increased systematic legitimacy, and greater 
political stability” (1999, 242).  However, this pluralist conception is somewhat at odds 
with the authorization model – the former requires the Court to be responsive to demands 
of litigating groups, while the latter requires the Court to adhere to the policy platforms 
by which they were selected.  
6 They do not argue that these connections are always good for democracy: Lowell (2000, 
2003), for example, has argued that legislative deferrals to the Court might be, at least in 
part, driven by attempts to avoid accountability. 
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example, or, in principle, the large bureaucracies of modern states (On the Social 
Contract, 1762).7 Generally, such authorization is defended from a pragmatic standpoint 
(the people cannot do everything) as well as from the standpoint of expertise (experts will 
better execute the people’s will than the people themselves). The latter argument is 
particularly relevant in the context of the judiciary, where it is sometimes said that judges 
are authorized because of their expert status.   
But when the will of the people is vague or silent, or when oversight and 
enforcement is difficult, the authorization model seems to do more than authorize – it 
seems to remit sovereignty. And, it is important to remember, the legal scholars who are 
arguing with the authorizer model are not claiming that the judiciary is highly 
constrained, either by the text or by other institutions (such as the legislature or the 
executive); these scholars are arguing the exact opposite. The authorizer model, then, 
seems to base its claim for democratic legitimacy on an (implied) normative assumption 
that judges must strictly adhere to the word of the law; but, on the other hand, this model 
takes its bearings from empirical work that claims judges do the opposite. The problem is 
not with this set of legal scholarship (which I will build on in this dissertation), but with 
the concept of authorization that is being employed – it is this concept that the 
“constructivist turn” has undermined.  
The interpreter model. As the name suggests, we can read this group as 
understanding the judiciary’s role largely as one of interpretation. The people, according 
                                                
7 Democracy seems to require more than authorization. Consider Hobbes, for example. 
Hobbes is often thought to be the grandfather of the authorization model, yet few, if any, 
would claim he is a democratic theorist: democracy appears to require greater 
participation in governance and at least some degree of political equality. 
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to this model, have instantiated their will in higher law. The Constitution is conceived of 
as the will of the people, and justices, as interpreters of the Constitution, carry out the 
people’s will. I include in this group those who look to original intent, original meaning, 
or original understanding in constitutional interpretation (e.g., Justice Antonin Scalia, 
Justice Clarence Thomas, Robert Bork); those who see the Constitution as an instance of 
national precommitment (Elster, 2000); as well as those who argue that the Constitution 
receives periodic injections of popular will via constitutional “revolutions” (Ackerman, 
1991); and those who argue that the Court’s democratic character derives from its unique 
ability, as an institution insulated from the electorate, to protect certain fundamental 
rights upon which democracy depends (Dworkin, 1999). 
In its most conservative, originalist forms, the interpretive model begs the 
question of why current citizenry should follow law created by citizens who are long 
dead. Some call this the Jeffersonian challenge, as Jefferson infamously said that 
constitutions should be rewritten every generation, and that anything else is undemocratic 
(Letter to James Madison, Sep. 6, 1789). In response, Elster (2000) has argued that the 
Constitution is an example of a national precommitment, and thus there are good reasons 
to follow an “old will” rather than a new one.  Ackerman (1991) has taken a different 
tack, arguing that revisions in the Constitution occur outside of the formal amendment 
process. Ackerman claims that, at decisive moments in national history (such as the New 
Deal), citizens leave their normal state of political passivity, engage in a constitutional 
“revolution,” and provide governing officials with a clear mandate for Constitutional 
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change.8 For constitutional representative governments, the result of this model is a 
dualist conception of politics (Urbinati, 2006, 95-6). Democracy is confined to the 
moment(s) of constitutional founding (or revolution); this creates an order that is 
“discretely democratic” (Urbinati, 2006, 96)).  
The interpreter model not only faces normative challenges; it also faces two 
empirical challenges, both of which echo the empirical challenges political scientists 
encountered when trying to locate “the people” and their “interests.” For one, it easy to 
argue that the Constitution is not actually the will of the people. Some argue that the 
Constitution is the product of elites (e.g., Parenti, 1980), while others point towards the 
document’s contentious origins, which makes it difficult to locate “one real will” of the 
people (e.g., Rakove, 1996). The arguments directed at the Founding moment can also be 
directed at so-called constitutional revolutions.  The problem is not only that one 
particular moment might be seen as contentious and unstable, and thus making it hard to 
                                                
8 In making this argument, Ackerman, interestingly, makes a similar theoretical move 
that normative theorists of representation would make fifteen years later, and which, 
according to Disch (2008), Pitkin (1967) made twenty years earlier. In his reading of The 
Federalist Papers, Ackerman (1984) argues that the Founders saw the division of 
branches countering the assumption “that when Congress (or the President or the Court) 
speaks during periods of normal politics we can hear the genuine voice of the American 
people” (1027).  Such an assumption is, Ackerman claims, “naive synecdoche” (1984, 
1027). While Ackerman’s fracturing of the “genuine voice” is a radical move away from 
mandate representation, he, like Pitkin (1967; Disch, 2008), falls back into the mandate 
model with his argument that “revolutionary politics” can be construed as the people’s 
genuine will. Or, perhaps, we should say that Ackerman simply did not go as far as Pitkin 
and contemporary theorists: in his warning that the legislature does not stand in for the 
people, Ackerman appears to have seen a problem of “misplaced concreteness or 
reification” (my italics), not, necessarily, a problem with the “concreteness or reification” 
of “the people” (1984, 1026). 
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identify a coherent will; it is also that these “moments” might be better characterized as 
dynamic processes.9  
Furthermore, the course of the development of constitutional common law cannot 
be linked to the episodic exercise of the will. Consider “expansive federal power; 
expansive presidential power, particularly in foreign affairs; the current contours of 
freedom of expression; the federalization of criminal procedure; a conception of racial 
equality that disapproves de jure distinctions and intentional discrimination; the rule of 
one person, one vote; a (somewhat formal) principle of gender equality; and reproductive 
freedom protected against criminalization” (Strauss, 1996, 929). None of these principles 
are clearly “rooted in original intent,” nor do they have “particularly strong textual roots,” 
nor is there an obvious “‘moment’ at which a strong popular consensus crystallized 
behind them” (Strauss, 1996, 929). 
The facilitator model. I include in this group scholarship that identifies the 
judiciary as a promoter and/or protector of democracy. For example, one might argue the 
Constitution is essentially a proceduralist document that provides the structure for 
democratic self-rule (Ely, 1980). The role of judges is to enforce those procedures, which 
is particularly important as elected officials have incentives to alter procedures in order to 
gain electoral advantages. Others have argued that the facilitating role of the judiciary is 
through the encouragement of consent. That consent might be based on the belief that the 
Constitution is a contingent agreement, and so “enticing losers into a continuing 
                                                
9 Methodological work in political development has also problematized the sort of 
periodization employed by Ackerman, which, it is argued, overemphasizes temporal 
discontinuities and overlooks continuities (e.g., Kersh, 2005; Mayhew, 2005; Orren and 
Skowronek, 2004; Skowronek, 2002; Thelen, 2003). 
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conversation” (Seidman, 2001), or it might be based on the belief that the judiciary can 
instigate and foster deliberation among political actors when there is disagreement, 
generating the democratic outcome of accommodation based on mutual respect (Burt, 
1992). Or, the judiciary can be construed as facilitating democratic deliberation when it 
follows a particular doctrinal approach, such as minimalism, and protects “core” values 
(Sunstein, 1993), or through the behavior of Court justices, who might address other 
political actors through their opinions and dissents (Guinier, 2009). Or, judicial review 
can be understood to “force[s] political debate to include argument over principle” 
(Dworking, 1985, 70).10 Certain “out-of-favor Supreme Court decisions” are also pointed 
to as inciting debate (Hamilton, 2009, 121). 
The facilitator model raises the question of why a small number of unelected 
justices with life tenure are needed to regulate, protect, and develop democracy.11 Recall 
the empirical work of the “constructivist turn” – this work suggests that there is no such 
thing as impartial facilitation. It implies that those who “facilitate” are, in fact, 
                                                
10 Dworkin, here, might come closest to claiming that the judiciary contributes to a 
collective process of good judgment. However, this is a claim Dworkin only introduces at 
the end of an argument against originalist and proceduralist justifications of judicial 
review; he does not develop this point. 
11 Waldron (2006) sums up this view: “By privileging majority voting among a small 
number of unelected and unaccountable judges, [judicial review] disenfranchises ordinary 
citizens and brushes aside cherished principles of representation and political equality in 
the final resolution of issues about rights” (1353).  Possibly the most frequently rejoinder 
to those who, like Waldron, would abolish judicial review, is that the populace must be 
protected from itself – there is the concern with the tyranny of the majority, as well as the 
people’s tendency to not, on occasion, recognize what is “in its best interest,” and get 
carried away by immediate, short-term concerns, or inflamed passions.  But these are not 
obviously democratic arguments for judicial review; these appear to be liberal argument 
for judicial review.  While some might argue that there are certain substantive values that 
democracy requires (e.g., Dworkin, 1999), even those who take this position, such as 
Sunstein (1999), often still urge deference to legislative bodies when possible, suggesting 
concerns with the Court’s legitimacy as a wholly democratic institution. 
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constructing “the people” and their “interests” through the facilitation process. It thus 
suggests that the source of the judiciary’s democratic legitimacy cannot only be their role 
as impartial facilitators. 
This dissertation departs from other approaches to the judiciary. I argue that it is 
precisely the judiciary’s politicized relationship to mass politics and other institutions that 
enables its contribution to the construction of good collective judgment. To be clear, 
these contributions do not provide the judiciary with a specifically democratic form of 
legitimacy; rather, I argue, its contributions are epistemic. To make this argument, I take 
advantage of a tradition in public law scholarship that studies the judiciary in an 
interbranch context (see Barnes, 2007, for an overview). Once one considers the courts’ 
relationships to other governing institutions, it is clear the court is an active participant in 
mass politics, and contributes – often indirectly – to collective processes of judgment. 
Social movements, for example, intentionally use the judiciary to draw attention to their 
causes, grow their ranks, and thus gain voice in democratic forums, like direct legislation 
or legislatures (e.g., McCann, 1994). Certain highly salient judicial decisions contribute 
to the escalation of conflict and countermobilization (or what some call “backlash,” see 
Greenhouse and Siegel, 2011, 149), while other decisions prompt legislative responses 
(e.g., Keck, 2009). I also argue that the judiciary’s contribution relies less on the 
enlightened and impartial judgment of judicial officials, and more on the institutional 
structure of the judiciary – such as rules of standing – and those who pursue change 
through litigation. This dissertation reinterprets responses of citizens and other 
institutions to the judiciary as part of the process of collective judgment, arguing that the 
judiciary contributes to collective good judgment. 
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Direct legislation 
Much democratic theory (and perhaps intuition) suggests that direct legislation – 
ballot initiatives (popular votes which create new laws) and referendums (popular votes 
on existent laws) – is the institution least likely to contribute to processes of judgment. 
This institution of mass democracy falls far short of deliberative democrats’ ideal of 
relatively symmetric power relations, and appears particularly vulnerable to the 
manipulations of powerful individuals and groups. Direct legislation has also been 
charged with restricting minority rights – one study found that the pass rate of those 
initiatives seeking to restrict minority rights is much higher (78%) than the average 
initiative pass rate (33%) (Gamble, 1997). It has also been criticized for generating 
confusing ballots, which, besides being a problem in itself, also contribute to biases 
against particular groups, such as the poorer and less educated (Magleby, 1984, 1994). 
Direct legislation, it is said, oversimplifies complex issues (Zimmerman, 1986). Direct 
legislation has also been charged with creating divisiveness, dominating the political 
landscape with issues only of concern to narrow interest groups, and limiting political 
participation to a yes/no vote (Magleby, 1994). And, some argue, direct legislation makes 
legislatures ineffective: for example, California’s Proposition 13, which increased 
barriers for taxation, has been blamed for problems with the state’s educational system 
(see, e.g., O’Leary, 2009). 
These concerns make direct legislation an ideal case to evaluate the claim that 
mass democratic politics are antagonistic to good judgment. But there are other reasons to 
examine direct legislation, as well. For one, the use of direct legislation, and its influence 
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on U.S. politics, is rising (see e.g., Lupia and Matsusaka, 2004; Donovan, Tolbert, and 
Smith, 2009). If we want to understand how collective judgment is constructed, we 
should not ignore influential institutions. For another, because institutions like direct 
legislation have largely been ignored by deliberative theorists, they are a particularly rich 
source for studying the construction of judgment. The case of direct legislation not only 
offers insight into one of the most prevalent political processes in the U.S., it also offers 
different institutional features to analyze.  
In my fourth chapter, I note that certain assumptions about direct legislation – like 
the ease with which powerful corporate interests can dominate discourse and so 
determine outcomes – are not entirely borne out by empirical work. Instead, a more 
complex picture of direct legislation emerges. My evaluation further complicates the 
picture. I show that direct legislation’s contributions to collective processes of judgment 
are contingent on its relation to other institutions. For example, the timing of initiatives – 
specifically their concurrence with highly salient electoral campaigns – combined with 
past and current campaign finance law, enables great disparities in wealth to make direct 
legislation less hospitable to good judgment. 
 
Conclusion 
This dissertation asks how the design of governing institutions contribute to the 
judgments those institutions produce. To answer this question, I develop a notion of good 
judgment that is a dynamic and collective process. I demonstrate that the capacity of an 
institution to generate good judgment depends on its relation to other institutions. One 
implication of this dissertation is that mass politics is not necessarily in tension with, or 
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antagonistic to, good judgment. Another implication is an alternative understanding of 
the authority of direct legislation and the judiciary. Direct legislation is not necessarily an 
impoverished site of judgment formation, as some analyses of mass democratic politics 
suggest. And while some theories argue that the U.S. judiciary’s authority depends on its 
insulation from mass politics, I instead argue that it is the judiciary’s connections to mass 
democratic politics that enables its authority; this is not a specifically democratic 
authority, however – it is an authority derived from its contributions to collective 
processes of judgment. 
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Chapter 2 
Good Judgment 
 
 In the previous chapter, I explained how challenges to the old standard for 
evaluating democratic representation – the standard of congruence –prompted a turn to 
judgment, specifically, collective processes of judgment. In this chapter, I begin 
developing a distinct standard of good judgment that I will use in later chapter to evaluate 
collective processes of judgment within and between institutions. 
 In the first part of this chapter, I discuss Condorcet’s 1793 proposal for a new 
French constitution. Theorists have recently turned to his proposed constitution as an 
example of the institutionalized circulation of judgment and construction of “reflexivity” 
(Disch, 2011; Rosanvallon, 2011; Urbinati, 2006). Condorcet’s design promoted a 
reflexive process of deliberation within and among institutions. For example, his 
constitution created a series of local citizen assemblies, among which legislative 
proposals were circulated, and deliberated upon. Condorcet’s constitution can be read as 
a move toward the depersonalization of judgment: the source of judgment is not only 
individual capacity, but – at least in part – an institutional design where inter-institutional 
relations are of central import.  
However, I argue that Condorcet did not rely solely on governing institutions to 
generate good judgment. He also intended his constitution design to be supplemented 
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with a system of public education. I read Condorcet’s emphasis on the development of 
citizens’ capacities as foregrounding the need for good judgment not only at the level of 
institutional design, but also at the level of the individual. This fostering of individual 
level capacities through education is what, I argue, made Condorcet’s constitution 
democratic. Without the individual capacity for judgment, it is unclear what, if any, sort 
of power citizens would be exercising in a collective process of judgment. Condorcet’s 
plans for public education thus points to the limits of the design of governing institutions. 
Governing institutions may be designed to promote a process of collective judgment, but 
this design may not offer traction on the question of who is leading that collective 
process. So, instead of understanding the judgment-based contributions of governing 
institutions in terms of democratic authority, I suggest we understand judgment as a 
distinct evaluative standard.  
In the second part of this chapter, I develop this distinct evaluative standard of 
good judgment. In using the word good, I mean something like soundness; however, I use 
good instead of sound to reference an underlying hopefulness that sound judgment will 
generate good outcomes, however so understood. I begin developing this idea of good 
judgment with the concept of reflective equilibrium. In the first part of this chapter, I 
trace the concept’s transformation through three different areas of inquiry: science, 
morality, and politics. I use the work of John Rawls and Norman Daniels to outline 
reflective equilibrium as a standard for processes of individual and collective judgment. 
Reflective equilibrium is non-foundationalist, multi-directional, and largely procedural; 
as such, it is well suited to a concept of judgment that embraces pluralist politics, and 
follows the constructivist turn in democratic theorizing. 
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However, reflective equilibrium is not an entirely unproblematic concept – it can 
be read as urging convergence on a unitary value system, and it can be criticized for its 
abstract, intellectual character. To restrict judgment to abstract reflection and debate is 
“like Scholastic science,” to quote Elizabeth Anderson (2006, 5,). Anderson’s work on 
Mill and Dewey (Anderson, 1991, 2006) shows how the construction of good judgment 
requires more than reflection and deliberation. For example, good judgment also takes 
into account the observed consequences of commitments, and so is fostered by looking to 
individual and collective experience. In this chapter, I begin developing a standard of 
good judgment, using both the concept of reflective equilibrium, as well as criticisms of 
the concept.  
 
The institutional construction of collective judgment 
In Condorcet’s constitution, we see an instance of institutional design directed at 
the construction of collective judgment.  Condorcet was, like many theorists of the 18th 
century, concerned with providing a check against the “passions” of popular rule. But 
unlike those who sought a check outside the democratic system (the “disinterested” 
government of aristocrats, experts, or, perhaps, judges), Urbinati argues Condorcet 
proposed a democratic “check” by creating a reflexive system of representation (2006, 
195-6).12 If it had been implemented, Condorcet’s constitution would have created a 
complicated institutional structure that required prospective laws to be reviewed by many 
                                                
12 I should emphasize that Urbinati does not describe this process as “reflexive”: I take 
the term from Rosanvallon (2011), and follow Disch’s reading (2011) of Urbinati’s 
“indirect” as similar to “reflexive.”  
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different actors, in different settings, and at different times. Condorcet’s design was not a 
balance of (macro) powers, but a “diffusion” of power (Urbinati, 2006, 195). 
Condorcet’s constitution diffused power in a number of ways. First, he broke up 
the legislature – his constitution prescribed a committee structure (which is most unusual 
for a constitution prescription, particularly in the late 18th century, when constitutions 
tended to be vaguer). Next, he created a series of local assemblies, made up of citizens, 
and provided them with their own assembly hall. Proposals for legislation were to be 
circulated and reviewed among and between the committees, and the many local citizen 
assemblies. This meant that the passing of proposals was not unidirectional, but circular.  
The result was that lawmaking was diffused – physically, requiring the input of 
many citizens in different places, and temporally, as the legislative process was 
interrupted by prescribed time delays, as well as the necessity of circulating proposals.  
This indirect character of lawmaking supposedly encouraged reflection and deliberation, 
continuously invoking citizen judgment. Laws were thus generated by all citizens in a 
“reflexive” process. Judgments were exchanged between individuals, local (or “primary”) 
assemblies, the national assembly, and committees within the national assembly. 
Condorcet’s institutions constructed and “realized” these different interests (as proposed 
law or proposed repeals), and forced them to deliberate with each other. The goal was not 
to create the ideal conditions for deliberation within any single institution or institutions, 
as is arguably the case with much contemporary deliberative theory (Chambers, 2009). 
Instead, judgment was constructed by attending to both internal institutional design, as 
well as the relationships among different institutions.  
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In this constitutional design, individuals and (institutionally constructed) 
associations were asked to engage in a mutual adjustment of their commitments in an 
iterative process, as proposed laws and repeals are circulated. No particular institutional 
site is privileged; all are equal in the adjustment process. Furthermore, no principle, 
theory, or considered judgment is fixed; as Urbinati stresses, one of the most striking – 
and judgment invoking – features of Condorcet’s proposal was the power to repeal laws 
and, at any time, call for elections of new representatives (2006, 213-221). Condorcet 
also listed a “right to review, to reform and to change” the constitution in his opening 
“Declaration of the Natural, Civil, and Political Rights of Man” (Art. XXXIII). In 
addition to its iterative reflexivity and provisionality, we can also think of Condorcet’s 
prescribed time delays as instituting (or attempting to institute) the conditions necessary 
for “considered” judgments.  
In these ways – institutionalizing conditions for considered judgment, requiring 
collective and individual commitments to reflexively adjust themselves to one another, 
and emphasizing provisionality – Condorcet’s proposed constitution suggests one way of 
conceiving the institutional construction of collective judgment. His constitutional design 
also indicates the depersonalization of judgment at a conceptual level: the burden of good 
judgment is (at least partly) shifted from individuals to the design of institutions, with 
particular attention given to inter-institutional relations. 
 
Condorcet and the limits of the design of governing institutions 
The limits to the design of governing institutions is something of which 
Condorcet was well aware. Although democratic theorists have recently turned to 
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Condorcet for a model of reflexivity and the circulation of judgment (Disch, 2011; 
Rosanvallon, 2011; Urbinati, 2006), they have not also considered how Condorcet 
intended to supplement his constitutional design with a system for public education. 
Condorcet’s plan for French democracy had, I argue, two parts: not only the 
constitutional design outlined above, but also a system of national education. Ignoring 
Condorcet’s educational designs obscures Condorcet’s emphasis on the development of 
citizen capacities, outside of governing institutions’ potential educative effect. It also 
obscures how democracy depends on the capacity of citizens, not just the design of 
governing institutions.  
Besides the broad tendency for Enlightenment thinkers to emphasize education’s 
role in the development of “citizens,” one of the first pieces of evidence we have for the 
entwinement of Condorcet’s constitutional designs with education are his actions as head 
of the Academy of Sciences (a French organization of scientists, connected to the state). 
In 1774, Condorcet attempted to reorganize provincial scientific assemblies such that all 
would operate through the central Academy. His aim was provincial assemblies’ 
“freedom from the influence of social hierarchy, equality among the academicians, [and] 
uniform organization” (Baker, 1975, 54).   
His plan for scientific reform was developed in parallel with his friend Turgots’s 
Memoire sur les municipalities: the theme of both was “the rationalization of both 
political and scientific organization; the direction of scientific activity towards the 
greatest public utility and human well-being; the diffusion of enlightenment” (Baker, 
1975, 55).  In his biography of Turgot, Condorcet would write that Turgot’s assemblies’ 
“utility depends entirely upon the education of their members and the intelligence that 
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inspires them; and it was a question in France of giving a new education to a whole 
people, of stimulating new ideas within it at the same time as it was being called to new 
functions” (Baker, 1975, 55).  Baker claims, “The advancement of science was intimately 
associated in [Condorcet’s] thought with the rational organization of society, for 
scientific advance produced citizens capable of cultivating the moral and political 
sciences that were the basis of rational social and political conduct” (1975, 55). 
While Condorcet’s plan for the provincial assemblies’ reform was never 
implemented – Turgot had fallen from power at this point, and the provincials’ resisted 
his centralization efforts – Condorcet returned to his plan during the Revolution, where it 
“became the very linchpin of an educational system intended to transform subjects into 
citizens” (Baker, 1975, 55).  Around the time of the revolution, Condorcet produced a 
number of writings on education: “the five Mémoires sur l’instruction publique published 
between January and September 1791, and the Rapport et project de décret sur 
l’organisation générale de l’instruction publique presented to the Legislative Assembly, 
on behalf of its Committee on Public instruction, in April 1792” (Baker, 1975, 295). 
Baker writes that the Mémoires sur l’instruction publique begins with two 
assumptions, “the natural inequality of individual faculties and talents” and “the natural 
equality of individual rights” (Baker, 1975, 293). These two realities produced two 
threats in a democracy – one, governance by “stupidity,” an outcome quite likely in 
modern society, where divisions of labor narrowed the masses’ education; and, two, 
devolution to governance by technocrats or experts (Baker, 1975, 293-4).  In order to 
guard against both, Baker writes that Condorcet argued for a public, noncompulsory, 
primary education, “to make possible a real equality of rights and a real liberty of 
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individual choice and action” (Baker, 1975, 295).  Citizens would receive a basic 
“introduction to the physical sciences,” in order that they might not be deceived by “these 
great prejudices that have seduced nations,” while also receiving a civic education in the 
moral and political sciences (Baker, 1975, 297). To help execute this project of public 
education, Condorcet suggested a return to his 1774 proposal for the reformation of the 
provincial academic assemblies. 
Condorcet’s work on education suggests that the political institutions of his 
proposed constitution of 1793 was only one prong of his democratic designs. If the theory 
taken from Condorcet is one of reflexivity, emphasizing the differentiation his design 
produces in order, presumably, to refer back to itself, it is important to note that 
Condorcet did not see the circular action of reflexivity to be sufficient for the attainment 
of democracy. The reflexivity of his political institutions could not provide a full guard 
against either “stupidity,” or the rise of an aristocracy. As with other recent theorists (e.g., 
Mansbridge, 2003), Condorcet saw the circularity of the representative process requiring 
citizen education: education provides the means for citizens to recognize their own 
interests, and to differentiate between good and bad legislation, and good and bad 
representation. 
Citizens would make their “right to rights” a reality by choosing those political 
representatives who were capable of impartial and disinterested rule. For Condorcet, this 
meant that citizens need to be competent judgers, which, for him, implied the ability to 
reason, the ability to recognize the limits of their reason (and the superior reason and 
knowledge of others’), and the ability to know their own interests: 
In this way reason, become popular, will be truly the common patrimony 
of entire nations. In this way, with that exactness extending to moral ideas, 
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we shall see the disappearance of a contradiction shameful to the human 
mind, that between a wisdom that penetrates the secrets of nature or 
pursues the truths hidden in the skies, and a gross ignorance of ourselves 
and our dearest interest.  
(Condorcet, O.C., 7: 247-8; translated in Baker, 1975, 296) 
Basic public education, for Condorcet, consisted of learning what we would today call 
“critical thinking skills,” as well as learning the most recent “positive principles of the 
moral and political sciences” (Baker, 1975, 299).  Combining the two – positive 
principles and reason – would both allow and encourage citizens to judge legislation, and 
judge their representatives’ judgment.  
Without citizens who had the capacity to judge, the equal rights of citizens, as 
well as governance in citizens’ interests, would remain only an ideal, not a reality. A 
reflexive system allows for the circulation of judgment, but the system’s political and 
moral value – that it governed in “the general interest,” and that it actualized citizen 
rights – depended, for Condorcet, on an existent base of good citizen judgment, that is 
“critical thinking” and principled beliefs. In this way, we can read Condorcet’s 
educational plans as emphasizing the importance of the capacity for judgment as the 
individual level, and pointing to the limits of the design of governing institutions. The 
design of governing institutions might foster a collective judgment, but that design does 
not guarantee democracy, or the protection of rights. Rather than thinking of the 
construction of good judgment as conferring a specifically democratic form of authority, 
then, I suggest that we understand judgment to have a distinct value. In the second half of 
this chapter, I begin developing a distinct standard of judgment, by thinking through what 
justification on both the individual and collective levels might mean. 
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Reflective equilibrium 
Rawls, and his interpreter and fellow philosopher, Daniels, borrowed the idea of 
reflective equilibrium from Nelson Goodman’s work on induction and justification in the 
sciences ([1954] 1983). Goodman proposed the concept (which he did not, it is worth 
noting, label as such) in the process of arguing that progress had been made in the 
problem of justifying induction ([1954] 1983, 59-64). Goodman claimed that the figure 
with whom contemporary philosophers associated the central problem of induction – 
Hume – had, unbeknownst to them, also offered the beginning of a solution. Hume 
pointed out that predictions could not be justified by reference to past observations or 
logical inference; this is “Hume’s problem” of induction. Hume then suggested that the 
idea of the necessity of certain events – like being certain that when one lets a ball go 
mid-air it will not just hover there, but drop to the ground – was a habit of the mind. 
Goodman argued that what others had dismissed as mere description of practice was, in 
fact, a form of justification: in describing what constituted the practice of prediction, 
Hume had offered a way to differentiate between valid and invalid predictions.  
This distinction, Goodman note, gets to the heart of the idea of justification, for 
both induction and deduction. The validity of a deductive rule of inference depends upon 
the acceptability of its inferences, and vice versa. “If a rule yields inacceptable 
inferences, we drop it as invalid,” or amend it, and “an inference is rejected if it violates a 
rule we are unwilling to amend” (Goodman, [1954] 1983, 63-4). Justification – for both 
induction and deduction – is essentially circular and iterative, and it involves describing 
(or defining) valid rules. 
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We can understand moral justification in much the same way, Rawls and, one of 
his interpreters, Norman Daniels argued. But rather than scientific practice, we have the 
history of moral and political philosophy, and our own and others’ moral intuitions. 
Rather than inferences, we have considered judgments; rather than rules, we have 
principles; and rather than scientific theories, we have “background theories” (Rawls, 
[1971] 1999, 7-9, 40-46; [1993], 2005, 384n16; quote is from Daniels, 1979, 259).13 
Neither considered judgments, nor principles, nor background theories are ascribed a 
privileged role. Incoherence between any of these three levels of generality is resolved by 
adjustment to either considered judgments, principles, or background theories. This 
process of achieving reflective equilibrium is iterative. Reflective equilibrium is also 
unique in that it is scalable: a reflective equilibrium can be held among both individuals 
and communities. 
For an individual to achieve reflective equilibrium, she moves back and forth 
between these three levels of generality, adjusting her commitments as she proceeded. 
She would achieve “narrow” reflective equilibrium – a status – when her considered 
judgments, principles, and background theories have been adjusted for coherence. But 
narrow reflective equilibrium is insufficient: what mattered both to Rawls and Daniels is 
that the individual also investigated others’ moral theories, principles, and considered 
judgments. After putting her own commitments in (philosophical) conversation with 
others, and then proceeding to adjust her own commitments (following the same 
coherence constraint as before, again not privileging any level of generality), she could 
                                                
13 To be clear, Rawls did not make the direct comparison that I have between the 
different levels of generality in science and moral theory. 
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be said then, and only then, to be in the relevant type of reflective equilibrium, that is, 
“wide” reflective equilibrium.  
Wide reflective equilibrium was intended to be distinct from other evaluative 
theories, such as utilitarianism, simple intuitionism, and straightforward consistency. In 
emphasizing the distinct value of the different levels of generality, as well as the 
individual, reflective equilibrium denies that the conception of the good can be reduced to 
one measure. And in not privileging considered judgments, reflective equilibrium denies 
the priority of intuitions (see [1993] 2005, 96). And in requiring the examination of 
others’ commitments, reflective equilibrium requires more than simple internal 
consistency.  
The conceptual distinction between narrow and wide reflective equilibrium is 
discussed in Theory ([1971] 1999, 43) but Rawls does not name it as such until 
“Independence of Moral Theory” (1974, §1) (Rawls, [1993] 2005, 8n8). As Rawls 
explains in “Independence,” the idea behind reflective equilibrium is to investigate 
“moral sensibility” (and “that does not presuppose the existence of objective moral 
truths” making moral theory, he argues, independent of epistemology) (7, 9). Adhering to 
Goodman’s insight regarding the relation between justification and description of 
practice, Rawls’s goal with wide reflective equilibrium in Theory is, to put it most 
simply, to theorize existent morality. As he puts it in “Independence,”  
we investigate what principles people would acknowledge and accept the 
consequences of when they have had an opportunity to consider other 
plausible conceptions and to assess their supporting grounds. Taking this 
process to the limit, one seeks the conception, or plurality of conceptions, 
that would survive the rational consideration of all feasible conceptions 
and all reasonable arguments for them. (1974, 8) 
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But since “we cannot, of course, actually [have the people] do this,” Rawls argues we, as 
philosophers, should “do what seems like the next best thing,” and work out what 
conception or conceptions might exist at the limit (1974, 8).  
In Theory, the general wide reflective equilibrium – that which is worked out for 
people, collectively – is generated by Rawls’s own adjustment between what he 
understands to be the most relevant (and so already existent) background theories, 
principles, and considered judgments. These he takes from “the conceptions of justice 
known to us through the tradition of moral philosophy and any further one that occurs to 
us”; this he says, is “the most we can do” ([1971] 1999, 43). The contract that Rawls 
constructs is a product of this mutual adjustment, and Rawls leaves it open it for future 
revision – to put it overly simply (leaving out the important steps of how reflective 
equilibrium is achieved), Rawls explains, “justice as fairness is the hypothesis that the 
principles which would be chosen in the original position are identical with those that 
match our considered judgments and so these principles describe our sense of justice” 
([1971] 1999, 42). Rawls argues that this hypothesis, justice as fairness, is the basis for 
democratic institutions. 
Political Liberalism ([1993] 2005) was, it seems, a revision to this explicitly 
revisable hypothesis. Rawls retained and continued to develop the central ideas of 
Theory, but as he makes clear in his introductions to Liberalism, Theory was “unrealistic” 
in that it required “all its citizens [to] endorse… [a] comprehensive philosophical 
doctrine” of justice as fairness (2005, xvii, xvi, see also xl). In other words, Theory did 
not sufficiently attend to the conditions of reasonable moral pluralism. So, in Liberalism, 
Rawls made a crucial distinction between comprehensive doctrines and conceptions. His 
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goal was to create a political conception of justice that stood independently of 
comprehensive doctrines ([1993] 2005, 12). A political conception has its own values and 
ends, and makes no commitment to comprehensive doctrines like utilitarianism, which, in 
contrast to “conceptions,” are expansive in scope – applying to all people, for instance, 
and organizing all “recognized values and virtues” ([1993] 2005, 13). 
The wide reflective equilibrium of people (the general wide reflective 
equilibrium) thus came to mean something different in Liberalism. Rather than requiring 
a deep overlapping consensus of comprehensive doctrines, Liberalism only required that 
individuals’ – now, actually, “citizens’” – achieve “congruence” (or not be in conflict) in 
the general and wide reflective equilibrium ([1993] 2005, 11; 96-98). Or, as he puts it in 
Justice as Fairness: A Restatement, what is required is “coherence”  (2001, 32).  
In other words, the reflective equilibrium achieved in the political conception 
does not reflect any one individual comprehensive doctrine – the political conception is 
too shallow (or abstract). But in its shallowness, this political conception of justice is 
congruent with all “reasonable” comprehensive doctrines, Rawls argued. Of course, 
much depends on what is meant by “reasonable.” However, for our purposes, the point 
worth noting here – and which we will return to it later – is that a collective wide 
equilibrium in Liberalism is consistent with a high level of disagreement among 
individual reflective equilibriums.14 
 That is the basis concept. But Rawls’s apparent claim to know what people 
believe is just, and to know how people would organize their democracy is, for some, the 
                                                
14 For a more detailed discussion of this shift in Rawls’s concept of reflective 
equilibrium, see Daniels (2000). I have not followed his discussion here, as it is not 
simply an interpretation of Rawls, but also contributes additional conceptual distinctions. 
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epitome of liberalism’s hegemonic aspirations, and its false neutrality. Sheldon Wolin, 
for example, concluded, “democracy is not a distinctive presence in Liberalism” (1996, 
98). What Rawls created, Wolin argued, is a “guardian democracy,” where an elite-
prescribed constitutional structure constrains and “check[s] the demos” (1996, 100).  
“[A]n earlier age would have said [Rawls] legislates,” Wolin suggested (when describing 
Rawls’s use of public reason as a regulative principle for decisions on basic constitutional 
questions) (1996, 102). Wolin claimed that a notion of democracy not actually 
constructed by the people – and not just theoretically, but literally constructed through 
participation – is no democracy at all (1996, 98).  An argument for the unjust status quo 
is what Rawls actually created, not a concept of democracy (1996, e.g., 100-1). In other 
words, Wolin claimed that Rawls’s intention to transform reflective equilibrium from a 
purely philosophical concept into a practical political concept failed. 
In his defense, Rawls repeatedly emphasized the provisional and, even, 
asymptotic character of reflective equilibrium (e.g., ([1993] 2005, 97). Rawls wrote, for 
instance, that reflective equilibrium “is a point at infinity we can never reach, though we 
may get closer to it in the sense that through discussion, our ideals, principles, and 
judgments seem more reasonable to us and we regard them as better founded than they 
were before” ([1993] 2005, 385). Rawls also, at at least one point, refers to reflective 
equilibrium as a “procedure,” although he generally refers to it as a “status” (as a 
“procedure,” see 1974, 7). 
Significantly, the provisional character of the reflective equilibrium Rawls 
constructed in Liberalism was, he argued, dependent not simply upon his own 
philosophical search for reflective equilibrium. For example, Rawls explicitly rejected 
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Habermas’s criticism that the original position is “monological” as opposed to dialogical 
– that it was, as Habermas claimed, only Rawls the philosopher who, on his own, created 
the concept of justice. In response, Rawls wrote, “it is you and I – and so all citizens over 
time, one by one and in associations here and there – who judge the merits of the original 
position as a device of representation and the principles it yields” (383n14). Rawls, it 
seems, intended for his proposition to ultimately depend on how citizens responded to it.  
As the quote in the previous paragraph suggests (“we may get closer to it in the 
sense that through discussion… we regard them as better founded”), Rawls sometimes 
appears to write as if the relevant citizen response was located wholly in discourse and 
reasoning.15 However, Rawls also talks about institutionalization and practice, 
particularly so in Liberalism. Not only must we reflect, he wrote, “We also must examine 
how well these principles can be applied to democratic institutions and what their results 
would be, and hence ascertain how well they fit in practice with our considered 
judgments” ([1993], 2005, 381).  
In fact, Daniels argues that the emphasis on “an institutional mechanism” for 
generating wide reflective equilibrium is “what is distinctive about Rawls’s account after 
politicization” (by “politicization,” Daniels means Rawls’s shift to a political conception 
of justice in Liberalism) (Daniels, 2000, 141). Following Cohen (1994, 1530), Daniels 
argues that “institutions play an ‘educative role’” (2000, 146). “For example,” Daniels 
writes,  
the idea of political equality is manifest in many features of democratic 
institutions, explicitly in claims about equality before the law and equal 
civil rights but also implicitly in the way in which citizens are force to win 
                                                
15 But to be fair, Rawls, in this context, was noting one similarity between Habermas’s 
work and his own, so it would make sense that, here, he would emphasize discourse. 
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others to their projects in a political market and market context. These 
practices put pressure on people holding various comprehensive views to 
accommodate the idea of others as equal person and even as reasonable 
ones (Cohen 1994[a], 1532). People become attached to ideas they 
become familiar with and understand through these experiences. But this 
attachment need not be thought of as mere indoctrination; it is reasonably 
viewed as the result of learning and education. (2000, 146) 
 
In other words, Daniels reads Rawls as arguing that institutions help generate, over time, 
convergence on a political conception of justice.  
One could also argue that the convergence reading of institutions’ role is a 
departure from Rawls’s own thinking. As I noted above, Rawls did wish to consider 
“how well [constructed] principles can be applied to democratic institutions and what 
their results would be, and hence ascertain how well they fit in practice with our 
considered judgments on due reflection,” ([1993] 2005, 381). Rawls, here, suggests that 
some results might not “fit,” and so certain institutions should be rejected; this practice of 
rejecting principle or theories based on unacceptable inferences is at the core of the idea 
of a reflective equilibrium. Or, one could also argue there is a tension in Rawls, between, 
on the one hand, his early hope for convergence over time (rooted, perhaps, in a faith that 
liberal democracy would culminate in – or itself is – a universal moral truth), and his 
growing recognition of the reality of a deep and ultimately irreducible moral pluralism. 
Here is where it is helpful to set Rawls and his interpreters aside, and consider additional 
ways of thinking of justification. I begin developing a distinct standard of good judgment 
by returning to its origins in the philosophy of science. 
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Good judgment 
Goodman’s theory of justification suggests that good judgment should involve not 
only the reflexive adjustment of theories, principles, and particular considered judgments 
over time, but also an active search for unacceptable inferences. One of Goodman’s aims 
in developing the idea of reflective equilibrium was to show that progress had been made 
in understanding the logic of induction, and it was prompted by the generation of 
unacceptable inferences. As I noted above, Goodman ([1954] 1983) articulated the 
concept of reflective equilibrium in the process of arguing that Hume had not only posed 
“the” problem of induction, but that he had also made steps toward its resolution. Hume’s 
move to description was a first step, although it was incomplete, as it did not rule out 
unacceptable inferences. Likewise, Hempel made further progress, adjusting the rules in 
order to rule out further unacceptable inferences, although, as Goodman pointed out, it 
continued to generate at least one unacceptable inference ([1954] 1983, 67-81).  
We can read Goodman as making an argument for the possibility of learning even 
without convergence, at least in any thick sense: we can know something about 
induction, Goodman argued, without knowing exactly what it is. How do we generate this 
sort of knowledge? We look to unacceptable consequences, Goodman says, consequences 
that we realize our unacceptable not only through the rules of logic, but also because of 
their inconsistency with observation, including observed practices.  
In his own work, Goodman largely relied on logic and thought experiment to 
flush out unacceptable consequences. Anderson, however, has suggested that lived 
experience is also a rich source of knowledge: lived experience can indicate the 
unacceptability of particular judgments. Instead of relying wholly on the circular 
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adjustments of reflective equilibrium, Anderson argues we should turn to our own 
experiences and responses for evidence of value judgments’ worth. For example, we can 
live according to value judgments and learn whether certain values are “fruitful” – if they 
help “us discover new things we value, that we had not imagined before” (2004; quote, 
2006, 4).  
To exclude experience from the justification of values, as Anderson argues moral 
philosophy’s use of reflective equilibrium does, is to limit justification to the 
confrontation of different “moral opinions, without any connection to the wider world” 
(2006, 5).  “This is like Scholastic science,” she says, “to figure out the truth about the 
world, people reasoned from the opinions of Aristotle and his commentators, rather than 
going and gathering observations based on experiments” (2006, 5).  
Emotional experiences, Anderson argues, can serve as evidence for value 
judgments (1991, 2004, 2006). By emotional experiences, Anderson means “affectively 
colored experiences of persons, things, events, or states of the world,” for example, “joy 
in seeing someone” (2004, 9). Emotional experiences can satisfy the three conditions 
needed for a mental state to be “capable of standing in evidentiary relation” to value 
judgments: they can “have cognitive content,” can be independent of value judgments, 
and can be defeasible (Anderson, 2004, 9).16 We can also understand emotional 
experiences as capable of being “reliable or trustworthy” evidence – once acknowledging 
that emotional experiences are capable of being evidence, Anderson argues, “we would 
                                                
16 Note that for any particular emotional experience to count as evidence, it must meet all 
three conditions. Anderson does not argue that all emotional experiences do meet all 
three conditions, just that emotional experiences are capable of meeting these conditions. 
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be crazy not to” attend to them (2004, 9, 10). Ignoring the evidence of emotional 
experience is, Anderson points out, dogmatism (2004, 10). 
Anderson illustrates her argument with an example. Take Diane, she says. Diane 
excitedly begins a career in politics. However, Diane finds the actual experience of 
political life “intolerable – she is dispirited by the backbiting; she feels compromised by 
what she needs to do to raise campaign funds; legislative victories feel hollow” 
(Anderson, 2004, 10). Here, her emotional experience has cognitive content. It also exists 
independently of the prior value judgment (she found it intolerable when she had 
previously judged it to have positive value). Finally, it’s defeasible – Diane could have a 
friend, Sharon, who might persuade her that her disillusionment was unfounded, that she 
should take a long-term perspective, and that an apparently hollow legislative victory was 
actually meaningful, so she should instead feel “triumphant” (Anderson, 2004, 10). And 
to tell Diane to simply ignore her emotions here, to retain her initial value judgment that 
politics is a worth pursuit, would be crazy – it would be to ignore the evidence, and so act 
dogmatically (Anderson, 2004, 10). 
 Anderson’s work on value judgment suggests two reasons why we might want to 
extend the concept of good judgment beyond reflective equilibrium to emphasize the 
value of lived experience. For one, it has the potential to increase reflective equilibrium’s 
justificatory power, by increasing the scope of evidence. In addition to “moral opinions” 
we can include the evidence of fruitfulness and emotional experience. We might even say 
that to not take into account these responses to lived experience is to dogmatically ignore 
relevant evidence: that is what Anderson argues (2004, 10). 
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 We can also think about lived experience as another way of addressing the 
criticism that reflective equilibrium reduces to the undemocratic abstract idealization of 
one philosopher (or perhaps an association of philosophers, as Rawls no doubt engaged 
and employed the ideas of others). Emotional experiences might themselves prompt 
reflexivity among those who are not philosophers. Such is the case, Anderson argues, 
with Mill. It was Mill’s emotional experience with depression, and the failure of 
utilitarianism to account for it – the lived experience of conflict between emotions and 
prior moral judgment (judgment which, it’s worth nothing, was not simply an abstraction, 
but structured the way Mill lived) – that prompted his re-evaluation of utilitarianism 
(Anderson, 1991, 26).  
Of course, debating and deliberating over moral theory might prompt an 
emotional response – perhaps as we imagine the implications for our lives or others lives 
– but that emotional response does not meet the evidentiary requirements Anderson posits 
until we have actually lived those implications. This is because we don’t know exactly 
what these implications will be – we don’t know what experiences we will have (this is 
the claim Anderson makes – if we did know, then our emotional experiences would not 
be independent of our prior value judgments, and so would not count as evidence). Our 
experiences might well lead us to reject theories, principles, or judgments that we have 
affirmed. As the example of Mill and the work of Goodman suggest, such experiences of 
dissonance can prompt the reflexivity that improves judgment. 
Yet it is also true that Anderson’s analysis operates at the level of the individual; 
this being the case, can her potential contributions to a standard of good judgment -- 
actively searching for unacceptable consequences of commitments, and alertness to the 
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evidentiary value of lived experience, including emotions – be institutionalized in 
systems of governance? Can we use these criteria to evaluate collective processes of 
judgment, or are they only meaningful at the individual level? In my study of the 
judiciary in the next chapter, I show how these criteria can be used to evaluate governing 
institutions’ contributions to collective processes of judgment. 
 
Conclusion 
From one perspective, Condorcet’s plans for public education suggests that 
democracy ultimately depends on citizens, not the design of governing institutions. We 
can read Condorcet’s emphasis on the development of citizens’ capacities (or moral 
powers) as foregrounding individual responsibility.  
There is another way to think about Condorcet’s educational design, however: we 
can read it as a move towards the depersonalization of judgment. By incorporating the 
capacity for judgment into his institutional design, Condorcet helped shift the burden 
from individuals to a system of institutions. To read Condorcet in this latter way suggests 
the limits of the design of governing institutions: governing institutions might fosters 
collective processes of judgment, but such collective processes do not guarantee liberal 
democratic outcomes. But even without this guarantee, there might still be value in good 
judgment.  
In this chapter, I began developing a distinct standard of good judgment to 
evaluate governing institutions. My discussion of Rawls’s concept of reflective 
equilibrium, as well as some of his critics, suggests that good judgment has several 
elements. Good judgment is the individual and collective adjustment of commitments 
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over time in light of one another, privileging no one commitment, or set of commitments. 
Good judgment also involves attendance to the consequences of commitments, including 
the reflexive integration of evidence generated by individual and collective experience. 
Finally, good judgment offers no guarantee of liberal democratic outcomes. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 54 
Bibliography 
 
Anderson, Elizabeth. 1991. “John Stuart Mill and Experiments in Living.” Ethics 102(1):  
4-26. 
 
Anderson, Elizabeth. 2004. “Uses of Value Judgments in Science: A General Argument,  
with Lessons from a Case Study of Feminist Research on Divorce.” Hypatia  
19(1): 1-24. 
 
Anderson, Elizabeth. 2006. “Replies to My Critics.” Symposia on Gender, Race and  
Philosophy 2(1): 1-5. http://web.mit.edu/sgrp (accessed September 1, 2011). 
 
Baker, Keith Michael. 1975. Condorcet, From Natural Philosophy to Social  
Mathematics. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
 
Chambers, Simone. 2009. “Rhetoric and the Public Sphere: Has Deliberative Democracy  
Abandoned Mass Democracy?” Political Theory 37:323-50. 
 
Cohen, Joshua. 1994. “A More Democratic Liberalism.” Michigan Law Review 92(6):  
1506-43. 
 
Condorcet, Marquis De. 1793. “Plan of the French Constitution and Declaration of  
Rights: As Presented to the National Convention of France On the 16th of  
February, 1793. The Second Edition.” London: J.S. Jordan, No. 166, Fleet-Street. 
 
Condorcet, Marquis De. 1847-9. Oeuvres de Condorcet. Eds. M. F. Arago and A.  
Condorcet O’Connor. Paris. 
 
Daniels, Norman. 1979. “Wide Reflective Equilibrium and Theory Acceptance in  
Ethics.” Journal of Philosophy 76(5): 256 - 82. 
 
Daniels, Norman. 2000. “Reflective Equilibrium and Justice as Political.” In The Idea of  
a Political Liberalism: Essays on Rawls, eds. Victoria Davion and Clark Wolf.  
127-53. 
 
Disch, Lisa. 2011. “Toward a Mobilization Concept of Representation.” American  
Political Science Review 105(1): 100-14. 
 
Goodman, Nelson. [1954] 1983. “The New Riddle of Induction.” In Fact, Fiction, and  
Forecast. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
 
Habermas, Jurgen. 1970a. “The Scientization of Politics and Public Opinion.” In Toward  
a Rational Society: Student Protest, Science, and Politics, trans. Jeremy Shapiro.  
Boston: Beacon Press. 62-80. 
 
Habermas, Jurgen. 1970b. “Technology and Science as ‘Ideology.’” Toward a Rational  
 55 
Society: Student Protest, Science, and Politics, trans. Jeremy Shapiro. Boston:  
Beacon Press. 81-122. 
 
Mansbridge, Jane. 2003. “Rethinking Representation.” American Political Science  
Review 97(4): 515-528. 
 
Mikhail, John. 2010. “Rawls’ Concept of Reflective Equilibrium and its Original  
Function in ‘A Theory of Justice.’” Washing University Jurisprudence Review  
3.1: 1-30.  
 
Rawls, John. [1971] 1999. A Theory of Justice: Revised Edition. Cambridge: The  
Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. 
 
Rawls, John. 1974. “Independence of Moral Theory.” Proceedings and Addresses of the  
American Philosophical Association 49: 5-22. 
 
Rawls, John. [1993] 2005. Political Liberalism: Expanded Edition. New York: Columbia  
University Press. 
 
Rawls, John. 2001. Justice as Fairness: A Restatement. Cambridge, MA: The Belknap  
Press of Harvard University Press. 
 
Rosanvallon, Pierre. 2011. Democratic Legitimacy: Impartiality, Reflexivity, Proximity,  
trans. Arthur Goldhammer. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
 
Urbinati, Nadia. 2006. Representative Democracy: Principles and Genealogy. Chicago:  
The University of Chicago Press.  
 
Wolin, Sheldon S. 1996. “The Liberal/ Democratic Divide. On Rawl’s Political  
Liberalism.” Political Theory 24(1): 97-115. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 56 
 
 
 
Chapter 3 
Judgment and the Judiciary 
 
In the previous chapter, I argued that good judgment involves the reflexive 
adjustment of different commitments in light of one another, without privileging any one 
commitment or set of commitments. Good judgment seeks to uncover the unacceptable 
consequences of commitments, and is alert to the evidentiary value of lived experience, 
including emotions. With Condorcet’s proposed constitution, we saw how a diffused and 
divided system of institutional design can give voice to different commitments and 
concerns, and so generate a process of collective judgment; I suggested we understand 
this as a move towards the depersonalization of judgment. However, Condorcet’s 
approach – complementing his constitutional proposal with a public education system – 
also suggested the limits of the design of governing institutions. Governing institutions’ 
contributions to good judgment do not guarantee liberal democratic outcomes. Instead, I 
argued, we should think of judgment as an evaluative standard distinct from questions of 
liberal democratic authority. 
 In this chapter, I turn to the U.S. judiciary. I argue we should assess the judiciary 
in terms of its relations to other institutions, not in terms of the rights it does or does not 
protect, or its adherence to laws passed by elected officials. I argue the U.S. judiciary can 
contribute to good judgment – good in terms of justification – by giving voice to different 
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commitments, and prompting these commitments to engage with other commitments 
expressed in different institutional locations. The particular contributions of the judiciary 
are rooted in the nature of the adjudicatory process. Because adjudication requires actual 
controversies, the judiciary is particularly suited to seek out unacceptable consequences 
of held commitments. And because the judiciary requires litigating parties to be affected 
by the relevant law, it is also particularly positioned to be attentive to the lived experience 
of those consequences. Finally, because adjudication involves reason-giving, it 
encourages emotions to be articulated in a defeasible form, and so enables emotions to 
contribute to the construction of good judgment. 
 It is certainly not true that the judiciary is always makes these contributions. If we 
want to use the judiciary’s contributions to judgment to authorize its role in a democratic 
system, we would need to consider how often it contributes to judgment, as well as 
countervailing concerns. I do not take that project on here. Still, we can understand this 
chapter as providing additional conceptual resources for thinking through the judiciary’s 
contributions to the U.S. system. 
A number of scholars have shown how the judiciary can give voice to those 
otherwise excluded from the policy-making process (e.g., Frymer, 2003; Keck, 2009; 
Lawrence, 1990; McCann, 1994; Peretti, 1999; Zackin, 2008).17 That said, these 
arguments are largely grounded on exclusion from electoral policy-making: the implicit 
or explicit normative criteria is inclusive representation of interests (with the exception of 
Zackin, 2008). I build on these works, making the additional argument that such inclusion 
                                                
17 Lawrence aptly calls this the “Carolene tradition,” citing the Carolene footnote; she 
places Ely ([1980], 2002) and Bickel (1962) at the center of this tradition (1990, 90). 
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is also a collective good, as the inclusion of excluded voices improves the quality of 
collective judgment.  
For one, the inclusion of diverse voices allows collective judgment to take into 
account the evidential contributions of situated knowledge. Our own judgments are all 
limited, to some degree, by our background assumptions, based on our own unique 
experiences. Incorporating diverse perspectives thus has the potential to bring new ideas 
to bear on old questions. Incorporating a diversity of individual perspectives can generate 
more evidence to support (or challenge) existing judgments. This epistemological 
argument for diversity is an old one: it is one component of Mill’s argument for the value 
of free speech and experiments in living. More recent incarnations include arguments for 
the value of a feminist research agenda (Anderson, 2004; Anderson, 2006b), and for the 
value of “dissent” (Sunstein, 2003). Even if inclusion does not alter the conclusions of 
collective judgment, we can still understand that judgment to be improved, as its grounds 
for justification would have been strengthened. 
Below, I show how inclusion by the judiciary can also introduce an element of 
reflexivity to the processes of collective judgment formation: otherwise excluded 
commitments and concerns are given voice by the judiciary, and given voice in such a 
way that other voices are encouraged to respond. We can identify two aspects of 
litigation that produce this element of reflexivity. One is through a process of 
“consciousness-raising,” to use McCann’s term (1994, 63). 
 
 
 
 59 
Giving voice, and inviting response: consciousness-raising 
People can gain voice through the mobilization of rights discourses, creating 
“perceptions of entitlement” (Scheingold, 1974, 131), and by “raising expectations” 
(McCann, 1994, 64; Keck, 2009, 157).18 This consciousness-raising typically occurs via 
the media coverage litigation can generate. Consciousness-raising can promote 
deliberation outside of the courts, and it can draw more people to the movement. Both 
effects of consciousness-raising invite responses from the voices generated by other 
institutions, like state legislature and national legislatures. Consciousness-raising, it 
should be emphasized, does not necessarily require a sympathetic court; litigants can still 
lose a lawsuit, while gaining voice, as my examples below demonstrate. In addition, 
consciousness-raising, while often an explicit strategy of interest groups, is not limited to 
interest groups. As I argue below, the inherently uncontrollable nature of litigation further 
contributes to the inclusivity of voices expressed via the judiciary. 
How litigation can give voice to those otherwise excluded – and so make the 
judiciary a unique site for the articulation of certain voices – is demonstrated in the early 
history of the ACLU. While it does not always serve this role (I outline some constraints 
below), Zackin’s work on the ACLU suggests that the judiciary is particularly suited to 
giving voice to unpopular groups. Zackin’s work on the ACLU also suggests that social 
movement organizers believe that this is a role the judiciary can and does play, and these 
beliefs work as a sort of feedback loop: these beliefs encourage unpopular groups to 
                                                
18 While critics of social movement’s use of litigation argue that citizens are unaware of 
the content of court decisions (Rosenberg, 1991), such criticism fails to consider how, 
exactly, social movements gain voice via the judiciary. Arguments for litigation’s value 
do not assume that people have any knowledge of courts’ legal reasoning: the claim is not 
that elite judges become the mouthpiece of excluded peoples. 
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appeal to the judiciary, making it even more likely that the judiciary becomes a site for 
articulation of unpopular groups’ concerns. 
While the ACLU is now recognized for its litigation efforts, it did not start out in 
the lawsuit business. Its shift toward litigation, Zackin (2008) shows, was a product of its 
failure to be heard in both formal “institutions and grassroots” efforts (371). In fact, the 
earliest members of the ACLU, like many other Progressives, eschewed litigation, seeing 
the Lochner-era courts as unsympathetic to their particular platform of social change 
(Zackin, 2008, 373-4). It was only when the ACLU’s pamphleteering, protests, speaking 
tours, and lobbying of elected officials failed that they turned to the judiciary (Zackin, 
2008, 373-4). The early ACLU’s failures can, Zackin argues, be largely attributed to the 
people it represented, who were some of the most unpopular of the age: “labor leaders, 
socialists, and communists” (2008, 381). 
Likely inspired as well by the NAACP (which had long used the courts as a 
political tool), the ACLU took on litigation as a key mobilizing strategy in the 1920s. The 
ACLU’s turn to the courts, Zackin argues, preceded their belief that the courts would 
support their arguments for reform; they found value in the publicity litigation produced 
(2008, 375, 380, 381, 386). In other words, ACLU’s litigation strategy used the courts to 
promote deliberation outside the courts – both for and against ACLU’s policy position –  
after the unpopularity of those it represented resulted in exclusion from other democratic 
forums (Zackin, 2008). Deliberation outside of the courts can then invite responses from 
other institutions. 
 Consider, for example, the pay equity movement. In his study of the pay equity 
movement, McCann (1994) shows how movement leaders intentionally used litigation as 
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a “catalyst” and form of “consciousness-raising” (58-74) that could then provoke a 
response in and by other forums. McCann show how the pay equity “issue became 
newsworthy during the period of favorable court decisions,” and that “the overwhelming 
majority of [articles granting substantial attention to pay equity issues] explicitly 
concerned lawsuits and legal issues” (1994, 59). Media coverage of the other political 
actions the pay equity movement took – like “legislation, electoral campaigns, labor 
strikes, and union negotiation battles” – was “dwarfed” by coverage of their lawsuits 
(1994, 59).  
For example, consider a well-covered Supreme Court decision, The County of 
Washington, Oregon v. Gunther (1981), which was followed by “over a dozen new 
EEOC charges and lawsuits, state task forces and commissions, and other efforts by 
unions and women’s groups,” including one union’s first pay equity strike (McCann, 54, 
53). In discussing a Washington state lawsuit that followed Gunther, one movement 
leader told McCann that it “really raised people’s consciousness about what unions can 
do and about the value of organized action for women workers. People were educated 
about the issue by the continuing stories in the newspaper. People really started to get 
active around the cause after the suit was filed” (1994, 70). Another movement member 
agreed that the lawsuit “really did politicize a lot of people, at least to the extent of 
understanding the issue and doing something about it…. [It] was the major rallying 
point” (1994, 70). The pay equity movement shows how litigation can introduce 
previously excluded voices to the larger public – both directly through media coverage, 
and by raising a movement’s numbers – enabling those excluded to have a voice in other 
forums, and invite responses from politicians in electoral institutions and from 
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bureaucrats. Note, also, that these responses need not all affirm the movement: the point 
for a collective process of judgment is that these questions were put before the public, 
and invited response. 
Another way to understand this consciousness-raising role of litigation is through 
the concept of “outside lobbying” (Kollman, 1998). Outside lobbying involves “attempts 
by interest group leaders to mobilize citizens outside the policymaking community to 
contact or pressure public officials inside the policymaking community” (Kollman, 1998, 
3). Outside lobbying takes advantage of both the movability of public opinion, as well as 
elites’ difficulty in gauging issue salience (which is relatively volatile) (Kollman, 1998, 
25-6). It can take essentially two forms – one is signaling the salience of an issue to 
policymakers, the other involves actually increasing salience by “conflict expansion” 
(Kollman, 1998, 12). We can see both forms at work in the publicity-oriented litigation 
described by Zackin (2008) and McCann (1994). Litigation can be a way for groups to 
pressure elected officials to engage voices that have not been recognized in other 
democratic forums, both by “expanding the conflict” and signaling to officials the 
importance of an issue to the electorate. That the judiciary enables such outside lobbying 
generates reflexivity, as elected officials are pressured to respond to these newly included 
voices. 
While both the pay equity movement and the ACLU are both examples of 
organized groups given voice through the judiciary, such articulations need not always be 
the product of a planned interest group strategy. Consider, for example, Bowers v. Evans, 
the 1986 Supreme Court decision that upheld the constitutionality of a sodomy statute. 
Bowers was also unplanned due to the decentralized character of gay rights litigation at 
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the time. The suit was initially sponsored by the Georgia chapter of the ACLU (acting 
without direction from the national ACLU office), but disagreement arose among the 
different litigators then involved in gay rights advocacy. Many thought that Bowers 
should not be pursued in the higher courts because it only brought a privacy claim, and 
did not include an equal protection claim.  
The cooperating attorney who was litigating Bowers nonetheless continued with 
the suit. When, after much pressure from Lambda Legal, the first gay rights litigation 
group, the ACLU national office eventually lent its support, Bowers’s path to the higher 
courts can hardly be construed as the result of a planned strategy (Anderson, 2005, 84-5).  
Such “disagreement among counsel” is one of a number of factors that makes litigation 
campaigns “responsive and reflexive” to disparate voices (Wasby, 1984, 94, quoting Jack 
Greenberg, 1973; Wasby, 1984, 84).  And, it is worth noting, such disagreements and 
lack of strategic planning is even more likely as the number of litigators increases 
(Wasby, 1984, 94).  
Note that same-sex marriage, like Bowers, was also the product of litigants acting 
independently of interest groups: the case that put same-sex marriage on the national 
agenda, Baehr v. Lewin (1993), was also brought by a private attorney. The attorney 
leading Baehr had previously worked with the ACLU, but Baehr was not an ACLU case 
(Anderson, 2005, 178; Eskridge, 2002, 16-17). Gay rights litigators had not been 
advocating for same-sex marriage: it was only when they realized that Baehr would be an 
influential case, and that they could not afford to not get involved, that Lambda Legal 
offered its assistance (Anderson, 2005, 53). Yet another prominent example of interest 
groups’ inability to control litigating voices is Olson’s and Boies’s challenge to 
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California’s Proposition 8, which leading gay rights groups opposed until it was clear the 
case would not be stopped (Liptak, 2009; Svetvilas, 2010). 
While Bowers was widely considered a loss for gay rights advocates, the decision 
placed the question of gay rights on the national agenda (Anderson, 2005, 94). Bowers is 
also credited with helping to mobilize gays and their allies. The 1987 March on 
Washington was “conceived in large part as a response to Bowers” (Anderson, 2005, 
217). This gay rights demonstration attracted “hundreds of thousands,” attracting, in turn, 
national coverage (Anderson, 2005, 217).19 Bowers became key in raising money for 
further litigation: Contributions to Lambda Legal, the leading gay litigation group, tripled 
in the year following the decision; on its own, the AIDS epidemic, which occurred over 
many years, would not seem to explain this sudden, massive spike in Lambda’s funding 
(Anderson, 2005, 45-6). 
We can interpret Bowers as catalyzing further political mobilization, which 
generated further litigation, which generated more responses from both the public and 
other institutions. Gay rights went on to take a prominent place on the national agenda in 
the decades following Bowers. This national discussion developed around four gay rights 
questions: gays in the military, the constitutionality of discrimination laws, gays in the 
Boy Scouts, and gay marriage (Anderson, 2005, 117-8). Anderson argues that all four of 
these issues were placed on the national agenda by gay rights litigation, inviting 
responses from state and national legislators, as well as citizens via direct legislation 
(Anderson, 2005, 118n8). I discuss some of these responses below. 
                                                
19 Of course, Bowers was not the only relevant event at the time: AIDS (including Rock 
Hudson’s revelation that he was gay and had AIDS, which occurred around the same 
time as the Bowers decision) also played a large role in making gays and gay rights a 
subject of public discussion in the 1980s (Anderson, 2005, 97). 
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Giving voice, and inviting response: policy-making powers 
In addition to consciousness-raising, reflexivity is also generated by the courts’ 
policy-making powers. While policy change is related to consciousness-raising – the 
intensity of media coverage of litigation can be influenced by anticipated policy change, 
and policy change can continue to fuel media coverage even after a case is decided – it 
has other effects. Policy change can give voice to those previously excluded from debates 
in mainstream electoral politics, and invite responses from other institutions. Policy 
change can also increase access to the judiciary, and so further enable the judiciary to 
contribute to the reflexive construction of collective judgment. Although judges’ 
aggressive opposition to litigants’ causes might neutralize the courts’ potential 
contributions to voice, the effects of policy-making, like consciousness-raising, do not 
depend on judges’ enthusiastic advocacy of litigants’ policies, and, often, even, do not 
depend on the courts’ implementation powers.  
Scholars have long recognized the courts as an alternative venue for interest 
groups seeking policy change. Citing case studies of the NAACP, the Jehovah’s 
Witnesses, the Legal Defense Fund, and the Legal Services Program as examples, Peretti 
notes that a number of interest groups “have turned to the courts after failing to win their 
political battles in legislative or executive forums” (1999, 221, 219). And in his study of 
labor unions, Frymer (2003) shows how activists can achieve their policy goals in the 
courts after elected officials have proved unresponsive. Despite these and other historical 
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(1991) argument is paradigmatic in its emphasis on the difficulties the courts face with 
implementation. 
While implementation is of central import for scholars like Peretti (1999), who 
see the court as another forum for pluralist politics and policy advocacy, implementation 
is not always necessary for the courts’ policy-making powers to provide excluded people 
with voice, and to have other institutional voices respond. Such reflexivity may occur as 
elected officials anticipate judicial decisions. Both Pickerill (2004) and Silverstein (2009, 
65-70) show that Congress takes into account future Supreme Court decisions in their 
internal deliberations, as they anticipate judicial review. Silverstein argues not only that 
the content of decisions are anticipated, but also the legal reasoning. This “juridification” 
of the lawmaking process includes legislators like members of Congress, but he argues it 
extends to all political actors with whom the Court engages, including “policy 
entrepreneurs, opinion leaders, the general public, and individual litigants” (2009, 5).  For 
example, Silverstein traces the recent history of the free exercise clause, arguing that its 
precedential history “spirals through all three branches of government” (2009, 71). 
The specter of a judicial decision can also provoke elected officials to confront an 
issue that they might have been avoiding – it can provide “political cover” and “shift the 
spectrum of compromise” (Keck, 2009, 159). For example, in the gay rights movement, 
Keck has noted a “steady stream of state legislatures has enacted antidiscrimination laws 
while the SSM conflict has proceeded in the courts” (2009, 159). We might also note that 
DADT’s repeal occurred in the shadow of an ongoing lawsuit. Patton (2007) uncovered a 
similar anticipatory pattern at the state level. She notes a “rapid diffusion of abortion 
 67 
policies prior to Court involvement,” with “numerous policies” passed while a case was 
under consideration (2007, 477).  
A judicial decision can also order a legislature to act, and so prompt a response 
from another institution. For example, in Baker v. State of Vermont (1999), the Vermont 
supreme court found a prohibition on same-sex marriage to be in violation of the state 
constitution, and they ordered the legislature to provide a correction (Anderson, 2005, 
186-7; Eskridge, 2002, 54). Elected officials, it seems, would have preferred to avoid 
such a risky and divisive issue, but the Vermont court demanded that the legislature 
engage the question of same-sex marriage in their four remaining months (Eskridge, 
2002, 57). The short meeting period of the Vermont legislature meant that officials could 
either risk a constitutional crisis or engage the issue – the Vermont constitution is 
relatively difficult to amend, which is one reason Vermont gay rights advocates chose it 
for a test cast (Anderson, 2005, 191-192). 
Because of this judicial prompting, the Vermont legislature set up a bipartisan 
commission to investigate the issue, and, ultimately, voted to approve civil unions among 
same-sex couples. According to the legislator heading the commission, the commission 
was a product of “[un]formed preferences” (Eskridge, 2002, 58). The twenty-nine days of 
investigative hearings held by the commission repeatedly drew large crowds, according 
to Eskridge (2002, 60). Addressing the issue of his constituents’ opposition to legislation 
that would provide same-sex couples with benefits equivalent to opposite-sex couples, 
one legislator asked, “How can people in my village say those things [that ‘marriage or 
civil unions were special rights’]?” (Eskridge, 2002, 75). He answered his own question: 
“[T]hese are the same things I said last year. My constituents feel the same way I did 
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when this issue was put on the table. It wasn’t something I wanted to talk about” 
(Eskridge, 2002, 75).  
Judicial decisions can also invite responses to otherwise excluded voices in the 
form of direct legislation. Take, for example, Baehr v. Lewin (1993). In this same-sex 
marriage lawsuit, Hawaii’s supreme court decided strict scrutiny should be applied, and 
then remanded it to trial court. While Baehr was being re-decided in the trial court, the 
Hawaii legislature addressed the issue, passing a statute declaring marriage to be between 
a man and a woman, while also setting up the Commission on Sexual Orientation and the 
Law “to study the legal inequities faced by same-sex couples” (Anderson, 2006, 178). As 
same-sex marriage was being debated in the legislature, the trial court ruled the Hawaii 
ban failed to pass even the lowest level of scrutiny, rational review. The decision was  
was nullified by a constitutional referendum defining marriage as between a man and a 
women. Same-sex marriage remained on the Hawaii political agenda, and the legislature 
passed the Reciprocal Beneficiaries Act, giving benefits to same-sex couples (Anderson, 
2005, 180-1). We can thus see Baehr as instigating a reflexive process among and 
between the courts, legislatures, and direct legislation. In this process, which different 
commitments were articulated (by both the left and right), and adjusted in light of each 
other over time. 
Baehr also prompted a national process of judgment on the question of same-sex 
marriage. In 1996 Congress passed the Defense of Marriage Act, in response to concerns 
that states would have to recognize Hawaiian same-sex marriages, or those of other states 
who might take a similar route. The issue was taken up in state politics, prompting 
debates in electoral politics and direct legislation campaigns; by 1998, thirty states had 
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passed their own “mini-DOMAs” (Anderson, 2005, 181). Yes, Baehr, did not prompt a 
stream of policy victories for the gay rights movement – although it should be noted that 
its most immediate consequence, the Reciprocal Beneficiaries Act, made Hawaii the most 
progressive state in terms of benefits to same-sex couples – but in terms of including 
excluded voices, and inviting responses from other institutions, Baehr, it seems, was a 
success.20 Baehr gave voice to gay rights advocates and their opponents, as it put the 
issue of same-sex marriage onto the national agenda, and the agenda of many states. It 
also prompted further litigation – the above-mentioned Baker (1999) grew directly out of 
the political organizing sparked by Baehr (Anderson, 2005, 179).  
In other words, what Rosenberg (1991, 2008) and Klarman (1994, 2004, 2005) 
condemn as “backlash” against the judiciary, is the judiciary contribution to a collective 
process of judgment. Voice is given to people excluded from democratic institutions like 
legislatures, and these institutions are prompted to respond. Note, here, too, that voice is 
given not just to gay rights advocates, but to their opponents as well. As Greenhouse and 
Siegel (2011) have suggested, that which travels under the name of “backlash” can also 
be read as “countermobilization and escalating conflict” (149). Such was the case, they 
argue, with Roe v. Wade (1973). Both mobilization for and against abortion had occurred 
in waves prior to and after Roe; Roe was another moment inviting countermobilization 
(2011, 157). 21 “Countermobilization is likely to occur only as movement claims begin to 
                                                
20 And as Keck (2009) notes, the mini-DOMAs Baehr appears to have prompted did not, 
for the most part, change the policy status quo (167-8). 
21 To be clear, Greenhouse and Siegel argue that Roe played a “role in polarization,” but 
they offer a number of potential roles Roe could have played, and place Roe’s import in 
the context of a political struggle that occurred outside the judiciary (e.g., in interest 
group lobbying and party strategy) (2011, 157). Their argument is against those who 
place Roe as the trigger for later polarization. 
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elicit public response,” and such public response often occurs “when a movement for 
constitutional change is gaining in credibility,” writes Siegel (in reference to feminist 
movements in the 1960s and 1970s) (Siegel, 2006, 1362; Greenhouse and Seigel, 2011, 
n174). Baehr shows how the judiciary can help elicit this public response, and so invite 
an extended reflexive process of collective judgment. 
Or, for example, consider Lawrence v. Texas (2003) and Goodridge v. 
Department of Public Health (2003).  In Lawrence, the Supreme Court reversed Bowers 
and struck the remaining fourteen state laws prohibiting sodomy. At roughly the same 
time was Goodridge, where the state supreme court of Massachusetts declared that same-
sex couples had a right to marry. Together, both decisions have been attributed with 
prompting a series of responses from legislatures and direct legislation: by 2006, 23 states 
had new prohibitions against same-sex marriage written into their constitutions, 
prompted, many assume, by Lawrence (Keck, 2009, 153; Stoutenborough., Haider-
Markel, Allen, 2006). Lawrence and Goodridge, as viable challenges to the status quo, 
both appeared to prompt countermobilization and an escalation of conflict that should 
also be interpreted as a process of collective judgment over time. 
 
Giving voice, and inviting response: the indirect effects of inclusion 
Even when a response is not immediately invited, we can still understand the 
inclusion of excluded voices as sometimes contributing, indirectly, to collective 
judgment. The judiciary can lower access barriers, and enable excluded voices to be 
heard in legislatures and courts. For example, consider Romer v. Evans (1996), where the 
Supreme Court struck down a Colorado initiative prohibiting anti-discrimination laws. As 
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the Court noted in their opinion, Colorado’s new constitutional prohibition on 
discriminatory laws limited one groups’ right to equal participation in the legislative 
process. By overturning the prohibition, the Court enabled excluded voices to be heard in 
legislative debates. And apparently such debates occurred, as the Colorado state 
legislature amended the state’s employment discrimination law to include sexual 
orientation in 2007 (Colorado Revised Statutes, 24-34-401, 24-34-402). 
Or consider Lawrence v. Texas (2003), the 6-3 decision reversing Bowers and 
striking the remaining fourteen state laws prohibiting sodomy. While an important policy 
victory, and an important moment in the politics of recognition, Lawrence was also 
valuable in making it easier for excluded voices to access the courts. Sodomy statutes had 
long been a significant barrier to access. Where sodomy was criminalized, it was hard to 
even discuss arguments against discrimination against gays in other areas, like 
“employment, military service, housing, pubic accommodations, immigration, speech and 
association, custody, adoption, marriage, and the provision of government benefits” 
(Anderson, 2005, 58).  
The D.C. Court of Appeals response to Margaret Padula’s employment 
discrimination suit against the FBI (Padula v. Webster, 1987) illustrates the inclusionary 
value of Lawrence. The Court dismissed Padula’s suit, writing, “If the [Supreme] Court 
was unwilling to object to laws that criminalize the behavior that defines a class, it is 
hardly open to a lower court to conclude that state sponsored discrimination against the 
class is invidious” (Anderson, 2005, 93, citing Padula, 103). The overturning of Bowers 
by Lawrence made it easier for arguments against discrimination to be heard in other 
lawsuits, particularly in federal courts (earlier gay rights victories like Baehr and Baker 
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relied on state constitutions). These other lawsuits can then invite responses to these 
previously excluded voices, and so contribute to the construction of collective judgment. 
For example, we can understand the federal lawsuit challenging DADT, Log 
Cabin Republicans v. United States of America (2010), to be facilitated by Lawrence’s 
decriminalization of sodomy. In Log Cabin Republicans, a California district court judge 
found that DADT violated the 1st and 5th Amendments, and issued an injunction, 
prohibiting enforcement of the policy. The DOJ appealed to the Ninth Circuit, who issued 
a stay on the injunction. In the shadow of this ongoing litigation, Congress debated, and 
eventually repealed, DADT (Don't Ask, Don't Tell Repeal Act of 2010). The access that 
Lawrence enabled, then, ultimately helped promote this reflexive relationship between 
the judiciary and Congress.  
 
Limits to inclusion 
The requirements of standing are but one barrier that must be overcome for 
excluded voices to gain access to the public via the judiciary. Significant resources are 
also needed to sustain the lengthy, repeated litigation that marks large-scale rights change 
(Epp, 1999). Higher courts that have control over their docket generally only accept cases 
that have “percolated,” that is, cases that represent “sustained litigation in lower courts,” 
and have repeatedly requested review (Epp, 1999, 35). In part, this is because the 
Supreme Court tends to accept cases where there are conflicts in lower courts (Perry, 
1994, 120-38) Furthermore, lest cases be merely symbolic, repeated litigation is required 
in order to “provid[e] clarification and enforcement” (Epp, 1999, 18).  
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A single case can be pursued by a relatively small number of wealthy benefactors, 
as in Boies’s and Olson’s challenge to Proposition 8, Perry v. Schwarzenegger (2010). 
Perry is backed by the firm Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, and funded by a small group of 
Hollywood elites, such as producer Rob Reiner (Svetvilas, 2010). However, the extended 
litigation required to pursue even one case like Perry is well beyond most people’s 
resources. Consider Bowers, for example: while the attorney in Bowers pursued the suit 
without national-level ACLU approval, the case would undoubtedly have been damaged, 
and possibly have come to a premature end, without the office’s eventual support. 
Successful litigation tends to require either the backing of a few wealthy elites or interest 
group support – and the latter requires either concentrated wealth or smaller donations 
from a large base.  
Or, the public can contribute resources, in the form of legal aid, fee shifting, and 
lawsuits brought by government offices like the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission and the Department of Justice (Epp, 1998, 58-64). Such public support for 
litigation can contribute to collective judgment, as it makes access to the judiciary less 
dependent on private wealth or interest group support. For example, the now-defunct 
federally funded legal aid organization, the Legal Services Program, shows how public 
funding can be used to overcome the financial barriers restricting access to the courts, 
and so contribute to collective judgment. Prior to the LSP’s founding in 1965, the 
Supreme Court had reviewed 6 poverty cases (Lawrence, 1990, 9). In the 9 years of the 
LSP’s existence, the Court reviewed 119 of its cases (Lawrence, 1990, 9). The LSP 
provided the poor with access to the courts, and these “newly enfranchised” changed the 
shape of poverty law (Lawrence, 1990, 112, 150-1).  
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That said, the direct funding of a legal organization like the LSP depends on the 
support of other branches. “Unlike most litigation-oriented groups, the LSP was not 
designed to pursue policy goals rejected elsewhere” notes Lawrence (1990, 118). The 
LSP operated as part of the larger War on Poverty: the program began with the support of 
national-level elites, and when it lost that support, it ended (1990, 9, 91-6, 116-9). This is 
not always the case with all sources of public support, however.  
When Congress changes standing rules and fee structures, the access those 
changes create can exceed Congressional intentions. For example, in the 1960s and 
1970s, Congress changed standing rules and fee awards to encourage the enforcement of 
civil rights (Frymer, 2003, 490-1). "The effective enforcement of federal civil rights 
statutes depends largely on the efforts of private citizens. Although some agencies of the 
U.S. government have civil rights responsibilities, their authority and resources are 
limited. In many instances where these laws are violated, it is necessary for the citizen to 
initiate court action to correct the illegality,” the drafters of the Civil Rights Attorney's 
Fees Award Act of 1976 explained (Frymer, 2003, 491).  
However, many of the changes in the 1960s and 1970s also gave access to labor 
groups, a consequence that Congress had not intended (2003, 491-2). Changes to rules 
like standing and fee structures – which, collectively, we can think of as “private 
enforcement regimes” – not only gives Congress imperfect control over access, these 
changes also tend to endure, surviving the Congress that creates them (Farhang, 2008, 
822, 829). In these ways – the endurance of changes to enforcement regimes, and the 
inability of Congress to control access through such regimes – some public forms of 
support for litigation do not require the direct support of elected officials. The discretion 
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given to the Court can enable the inclusion of otherwise excluded voices, and introduce 
an element of reflexivity into the larger institutions system, as it did with the labor cases 
Frymer studied (2003). 
The inclusion of excluded voices has its own distinct value for collective 
judgment, one that does not require reflexivity. The inclusion of diverse voices allows 
collective judgment to take into account the evidential contributions of situated 
knowledge. Our own judgments are all limited, to some degree, by our background 
assumptions, based on our own unique experiences. Incorporating diverse perspectives 
thus has the potential to bring new information to bear on old questions. Incorporating a 
diversity of individual perspectives can generate more evidence to support (or challenge) 
existing judgments, and generate new ones. This epistemological argument for diversity 
is an old one: it is a central to Mill’s argument in On Liberty for the value of free speech 
and experiments in living, for instance. More recent incarnations include arguments for 
the value of a feminist research agenda (Anderson, 2004; Anderson, 2006b), and the 
value of “dissent” (Sunstein, 2003). That said, we can also think of adjudication as well-
positioned to contribute particular types of evidence to collective judgment.  
 
Consequences and lived experience, including emotions 
 Because adjudication requires live controversies and the participation of affected 
parties, it is particularly sensitive to the consequences of existent laws, and the evidence 
of lived experiences. This concern with observed consequences can be contrasted with 
deliberative judgment not so bound: in comparison, the judgment of deliberation can 
seem like “a kind of thought experiment” (Anderson, 2006b, 14). For example, consider 
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again the LSP. As I noted above, the LSP played an important role in changing the 
structure of U.S. poverty law. The LSP was particularly attentive to the consequences of 
existent law on lived experience, so it serves as a dramatic – if atypical – example of how 
the judiciary can introduce the consequences of existent laws to the public in a reflexive 
process.22  
Unlike most interest groups, the LSP was highly decentralized, and did not 
organize litigation strategy in a top-down manner  (Lawrence, 1990, 28-9, 38-9, 40-6). 
Nor was the LSP’s work oriented by pre-existent policy goals: instead, its litigation 
strategy grew out of client concerns (Lawrence, 1990, 28-9, 38-9, 43-6). The result was a 
“great diversity in cases... reflecting the diverse concerns of the Program’s clients” 
(Lawrence, 1990, 58). And, unlike the legal aid services that had preceded (or followed) 
it, the LSP saw appellate advocacy as a key component of its service (Lawrence, 1990, 
15, 31). This combination ultimately created a “heterogenous LSP Supreme Court 
docket” (Lawrence, 1990, 58). 
 The LSP had great success in accessing the Supreme Court. Its success rate 
hovered around 72%, a rate comparable only to the DOJ (Lawrence, 1990, 86; Clayton, 
1992, 68-9). Other work suggests that the typical interest group has a success rate of 
around 10%, while the rate for individuals is closer to 3% (Lawrence, 1990, 75, citing 
Perry’s dissertation, now in Perry, 1994, 352, 358). The success of the LSP was very 
much a function of its clients’ prior exclusion, as these “newly enfranchised litigants 
                                                
22 Note, though, that the LSP’s distinctness does not stem from atypical judicial 
procedures; rather, the LSP’s distinctness derives from its instigating a sudden and 
dramatic increase in the inclusion of excluded voices, as well as the LSP’s unique 
emphasis on both client concerns, and appellate litigation. As I noted above, prior to the 
LSP, the Court had only taken 6 poverty cases. 
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present[ed] new opportunities for decision” (Lawrence, 1990, 112, 153). This is not to 
say that the LSP’s success rate was entirely a function of newly enfranchised litigants. 
The LSP’s success also required a sympathetic Court, as well as a sympathetic legal 
framework (Lawrence, 1990, 112). As I noted above, we can trace both these sympathies 
to the national elites of the time. That said, courts can only review the cases with which 
they are presented, so judicial policy-making is necessarily constrained by the suits that 
are filed (Lawrence, 1990, 3-5).  And, as Lawrence points out, “[o]nce a case goes to 
court, the success of litigants’ arguments often depend on their ability to relate their 
personal interest at stake in the litigation to a larger common purpose as defined in 
statutes and the constitution” (1990, 153). 
In the case of the LSP, the courts largely acted as an avenue for litigants to 
communicate conflicts in law, as local officials and bureaucracies implemented many 
policies that (ultimately) the courts found to be inconsistent with prior legal commitments 
(Lawrence, 1990, 94, 153). The LSP cases made these previous inconsistencies visible at 
the national level because the LSP gave voice to the experienced consequences of 
implementation. These contributions to collective judgment did not remain sequestered in 
the judiciary. The actions of the LSP can be interpreted as introducing a reflexive element 
into the system.  
Congress repeatedly reviewed the contributions of the LSP over the course of it 
history, as its opponents – driven, in part by resistance at the state and local level – 
objected to the LSP’s suits against government agencies (Lawrence, 1990, 33, 35-6; 116-
7). In 1967 and 1969, Congress express “limited” support for the LSP. Debate over the 
LSP’s proper role, and concomitant review of its activities, continued until its 
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replacement by the Legal Services Corporation, in 1974 (Lawrence, 1990, 116-7). 
Lawrence, for one, credits the sustained litigation of the LSP, and the conversations it 
prompted, with helping to shift (some of) the public’s understanding of welfare. Even 
though the Court declined to declare welfare a constitutional right, cases like Goldberg v 
Kelly (1970), which required states to provide a hearing before terminating a recipient’s 
welfare, and Shapiro v. Thompson (1969), which prohibited states from limiting welfare 
to those who had resided in state for a proscribed amount of time, helped many see 
welfare not as a privilege, but a right, argues Lawrence (1990, 118). 
It is worth nothing that locating the LSP’s contributions in the indirect 
construction of public judgment, rather than the court’s direct reform of poverty policy, 
also makes certain criticisms of the LSP less powerful. For example, Silverstein argues 
that the LSP’s founders, a couple devoted to fighting poverty, succumbed to “law’s 
allure” (2009, 109). Citing the failure of the LSP to force the Court to recognize welfare 
as a legal right, Silverstein claims that “a near-exclusive reliance on a judicial strategy 
never came close to forcing the government to do what politicians and public opinion did 
not support”; instead of working against electoral politics and public, he argues that the 
LSP should have worked with them (2009, 109). Yet such a dismissal of the LSP is based 
on a flattening of the concept of public opinion – as Lawrence’s work shows, different 
institutional sites articulated different concerns.23 To say that the LSP simply ignored 
politicians and public opinion also mischaracterizes the complexity of interbranch 
                                                
23 Silverstein’s argument also ignores how the LSP did, in fact, alter the status quo. Like 
Rosenberg’s and Klarman’s alarmist charges of backlash, Silverstein’s argument rests on 
the implicit but unproven assumption that policy change through legislatures was 
possible, and that such change would not have provoked a counter-mobilization similar to 
that provoked by the courts (see footnote 4). 
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relations, and falsely assumes that litigation is a unidirectional process, one that always 
operates independently of any significant public support: as Silverstein himself notes, the 
LSP began with the support of national elites, and it ended when that support was 
withdrawn. 
The judiciary’s attentiveness to the consequences of the lived experience of 
collective commitments has also been highlighted by feminist legal studies. This claim 
might initially appear perverse: classic works in feminist legal studies, like McKinnon 
(1990) and Crenshaw (1991), criticize the law for its false neutrality, and inattentiveness 
to the particularity of lived experiences. However, it’s worth noting that both of these 
critiques – one of which prompted as whole subset of scholarship devoted to 
intersectional analyses, a field itself devoted to the consequences of differences in lived 
experience – grew out of direct experience with litigation. We can locate McKinnon and 
Crenshaw within a movement that used women’s particular experiences under law to help 
alter collective judgment on a number of issues. For example, in her famous critique of 
sex equality law, McKinnon claims that women’s recently acquired access to the 
judiciary was the catalyst for improvements in assault, rape, abortion, family law, and tort 
law (1991, 1294-5).  
We can read McKinnon as arguing that is not the inherent structure of law, but the 
exclusion of women from the judiciary that helped produce a legal order with this false 
neutrality. After cataloguing the many different ways her litigation has shown how 
women can experience the law differently, McKinnon concluded her essay with a 
quintessentially Millian call to “fac[e] that we cannot know what women not unequal as 
women would want, how sexuality would be constructed, how law would relate to 
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society, what form the state would take, or even if there would be one” (1990, 1281). 
Because of our epistemological fallibility, good judgment rests on more than speculation 
and, even, deliberation: the judiciary can supplement collective judgment by bringing the 
diverse consequences of collective commitments to public attention. Of course, as 
McKinnon also notes, this requires that diverse voices have access to the judiciary, and, 
as I explained earlier, there are many constraints on such access in the U.S.  
A second aspect of the adjudicatory process that promotes better collective 
judgment is related to the first: the required participation of affected parties not only 
encourages judgments that consider actual consequences, it also introduces an affective 
element that can prompt reflection. As those who study social movements have noted, 
litigation is sometimes strategically deployed for its dramatic value (McCann, 1994, 58-
74; Zackin, 2008, 385-7).24 As I argued in Chapter 2, following Anderson (1991, 2004, 
2006a), we can understand emotional experiences as evidence for value judgments. The 
affective element introduced by the involvement of affected parties can thus provide 
more evidence for our judgments. Anderson also explains how emotional experiences can 
act as catalysts to note and reflect upon conflicts in our moral theories, principles, and 
particular judgments (1991, 26).  
Consider, for example, recent litigation on same-sex marriage litigation. 
Nussbaum (2010) argues that opposition to same-sex marriage is, ultimately, grounded in 
disgust of gays. As I also explained in Chapter 2, Anderson points out that, for emotions 
to serve as evidence, they must be defeasible (Anderson, 2004, 9-10). In other words, 
                                                
24 In his summary of a lengthy section on “Litigation, Publicity, and Mobilization,” 
McCann (1994) lists a central goal of movement litigation as “dramatiz[ing] key issues” 
(74). Zackin (2008) has a more extended discussion of the uses of “dramatization” (385-
7). 
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emotions must be not held dogmatically (Anderson, 2004, 9-10). From this perspective, 
then, it is okay, for example, to feel disgust (it can prompt reflection), but such disgust 
cannot remain in an indefeasible form if it is to contribute to good judgment. We can 
understand the legal order as requiring emotions to be voiced in a defeasible form: 
adjudication requires that disgust (or other emotions) be translated into reasons. And, 
furthermore, the legal order accepts only certain reasons as valid. Religious reasons are 
not accepted: the Establishment Clause requires that the state not favor any sect. When 
creating classifications, the Equal Protection requires that a classification be, at 
minimum, rationally related to a legitimate state interest; this excludes animus towards a 
group (e.g., the opinion in Romer). Rather than interpreting adjudication’s reason-giving 
process as properly excluding irrational emotions (as Nussbaum does, 2010), we should 
instead understand the legal order as enabling the inclusion of emotions by making 
emotions defeasible.25 
In some cases, when the evidence conflicts with commitments to certain 
principles – like not accepting animus as sufficient justification for the unequal treatment 
of groups, and the separation of church and state – we might, on due reflection, adjust the 
evidence. If we are disgusted, we might become less so. Or, we might adjust the 
                                                
25 Of course, this reading of Anderson is somewhat at cross-purposes with her intentions. 
But it is still consistent with two parts of her argument – that emotional experiences can 
prompt reflection, and that for emotions to serve as evidence for judgments they must be 
defeasible. Anderson's example of how we know emotions can be defensible is a 
conversation where reasons are given and reflected upon. Granted, her point with that 
conversation is to show that emotions are defeasible, but it nonetheless shows how, to use 
emotions as evidence, emotions have to be integrated with our other commitments in a 
reflexive manner that involves thinking through what reasons we might have to express a 
particular or emotion or emotions. That same point is apparent in other examples where 
she talks about the use of emotions – in her discussion of Mill, for example, Anderson 
emphasizes that he is able to use his own emotional experience only because of his great 
capacity for reflection and his highly ordered commitments (1991, 25). 
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principles: we might find that the separation of church and state is as not as important to 
us as it once was, for example. None of this is to argue that this reflexivity occurs in a 
vacuum – how we end up adjusting our commitments (if we do) would seem to depend 
on how strongly we are attached to any particular commitment, and those attachments are 
likely influenced by experiences outside of governing institutions.  
The judiciary has particular value for judgment in that it allows us to translate our 
lived experiences into evidence that can then be put in conversation with a relatively 
ordered set of commitments, as expressed in the legal order. In inviting responses to the 
constitutional order, including emotional ones, we can understand the judiciary to be 
building in a capacity for collective judgment at the level of institutions.  
 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I showed how the judiciary encourages reflexive adjustment 
among commitments in light of others. The judiciary contributes to this collective process 
of judgment by including otherwise excluded voices, looking to the diverse consequences 
of collectively held commitments as expressed in policy, and incorporating emotional 
experience as evidence. All this improves collective judgment, in that it makes it more 
justifiable. The judiciary’s contributions are a function of its relationships to other 
institutions, as well as the particular character of the adjudication process. That said, the 
judiciary’s contributions are not unlimited; in this chapter I also outlined constraints on 
access to the judiciary, constraints that limits its contributions to collective judgment. 
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Chapter 4 
 
Judgment and Direct Legislation 
 
 
 The use and import of direct legislation in American politics is rising (see e.g., 
Lupia and Matsusaka, 2004; Donovan, Tolbert, and Smith, 2009). However, democratic 
theorists have largely overlooked the institution (Chambers, 2009). Direct legislation falls 
short of deliberative democrats’ ideal of relatively symmetric power relations. Rhetoric, 
not reason, is understood as the currency of mass democracy. And actual currency is a 
concern, too: wealthy interests groups are known to dump massive amounts of money 
into direct legislation campaigns, furthering inequalities of voice. But one need not be a 
deliberative democrat to eschew the study of direct legislation. A consequentialist 
approach might have this effect as well: initiatives appear to have bankrupted California 
by limiting taxes and increasing spending, and in a number of states, citizens have used 
direct legislation to pass discriminatory laws.  
 While we are right to have worries with regards to direct legislation, I argue the 
above worries are the wrong worries. The standard criticisms of direct democracy – that 
it hurts minorities, bankrupts state budgets, relies on incompetent voters, and is 
susceptible to corporate influence – are complicated in the empirical literature. There is 
little evidence to suggest direct legislation is more harmful in these areas than 
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legislatures.  
 That said, the empirical literature is poorly positioned to provide a comprehensive 
defense of the institution. Empiricists largely appeal to a standard of congruence between 
the people’s preferences and policy outcomes: to the degree that governance results in 
median-reverting policy outcomes, most empiricists claim democracy has been achieved. 
Yet the congruence standard is problematic for two reasons. For one, it can be used to 
justify an appeal to the “people’s interest,” a standard long challenged by proponents of 
democracy. For another, it relies on the assumption that the people’s preferences are not 
constructed by political processes and institutions. The congruence standard’s reliance on 
this assumption of exogenous preferences has been challenged by both normative and 
empirical work (Disch, 2011).  
 In place of the standard of congruence, I develop a judgment-based model, and 
apply the model to the evaluation of direct legislation. Democratic theorists are turning to 
processes of citizen judgment formation to ground theories of legitimacy, placing the 
formation and circulation of judgment on par with, or above, decisions made in formal 
governing institutions. Still, the evaluative standards normative theorists have so far 
developed – like promotion of contention – are too capacious to replace the congruence 
standard. Part of the difficulty lies with the concept of judgment. If we define judgment 
as a mental activity, an activity that need not determine an observable act, it is not clear 
how it could be measured. 
 I approach this problem by studying the institutional conditions that enable and 
structure citizen judgment. I argue we should understand the creation of such enabling 
conditions as one feature by which we might evaluate democratic institutions. Institutions 
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affect citizen judgment through the construction of an inter-institutional agenda: citizen 
judgment, public opinion work shows, is not formed in institutional isolation. For 
example, when citizens judge an electoral candidate, their judgments are informed by the 
salient issues of the time, not only by the issues raised in the candidate’s campaign. 
Following public opinion work on the conditions that foster citizen judgment, I argue we 
should worry when institutions narrow the inter-institutional agenda to a single issue, and 
seek out institutional designs that contribute to a diverse inter-institutional agenda. 
 According to this judgment-based standard, direct legislation is more worrisome 
than the empirical literature concludes, but less worrisome than normative theorists might 
assume. In certain cases, direct legislation contributes to citizen judgment by diversifying 
the inter-institutional agenda; in other cases, direct legislation hinders citizen judgment 
by narrowing the inter-institutional agenda. A judgment-based model affirms some 
institutional alterations recommended by the congruence standard, like campaign finance 
reform, but it also suggests new ones, like staggering ballot initiatives and electoral 
campaigns. 
 
 The mythology of direct legislation   
Direct legislation is defined as citizens' direct vote on existent or proposed law. In 
the U.S., there are two sorts of institutions of direct legislation, initiatives and 
referendums. Initiatives are direct votes on laws proposed by citizens, and referendums 
are direct votes on existent laws, or laws proposed by legislatures (Boehmke, 2005, 15; 
Gerber, 1996, 264). Twenty-four states have legislative initiatives, and eighteen states 
have constitutional initiatives (Boehmke, 2005, 15, 16). Since the late 1970s, direct 
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legislation’s use has steadily risen (Matsusaka, 2004; Donovan, Tolbert, and Smith, 
2009). Direct legislation undoubtedly plays a significant role in American politics. 
While there have been normative debates over direct legislation since the 
institution was first proposed, the recent rise in direct legislation's influence, and 
developments in formal theory and public opinion scholarship, have been accompanied 
by new debates over the institutions’ normative value. On the questions of minority-
harming legislation, poor budgeting, corporate influence, and voter competence, there is 
little evidence to indicate that direct legislation is more harmful than the legislature.  
Minority-harming legislation. Direct legislation appears to epitomize the 
unbridled exercise of majority rule, particularly when direct legislation amends 
constitutions. Some of the most high profile examples of direct legislation are easily 
interpreted as majority tyranny: limitations on racial minorities’ access to housing and 
public accommodation; delays placed on school desegregation; discrimination against 
citizens with AIDS; English language mandates; the removal of affirmative action 
programs (the value to minorities which is, of course, debated); restrictions on the rights 
of illegal immigrants and aliens, and their access to state resources; and restrictions on 
gay rights and same-sex marriage (for a discussion of the history of some of these issues, 
see Gamble, 1997).  
 But it is not clear how often direct legislation actually damages minorities, nor is 
it clear that direct legislation is more damaging than other institutions. There is evidence 
that the most successful direct legislation – in terms of its approval by voters – is 
legislation that restricts minority rights. In a study of direct legislation on civil rights, 
covering the period of 1959 to 1993, Gamble (1997) found that initiatives restricting 
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minority rights experienced a much higher success rate (78%) than the average success 
rate (33%).  Yet, empirical work also suggests that the vast majority of initiatives do not 
address minority rights (Gamble, 1997; Hajnal, Gerber, and Louch, 2002).  
When direct legislation harmful to minorities does pass, the actual harm 
experienced by minorities likely varies widely, depending not only on the content of the 
law, but also the law’s implementation. Direct legislation faces many implementation 
problems. Legislatures often seem willing to overturn direct legislation (Smith, 2003). 
And a number of statutes ended up in state courts, delaying or preventing their 
implementation. Consider California: over a twenty-year period (1960-1980), state and 
Federal courts declared all but two initiatives in California wholly or partially 
unconstitutional (Magleby, 1994, 40). The most carefully documented problem with the 
implementation of direct legislation is the lack of oversight, and the delegation of the 
laws’ execution to bureaucrats, legislatures, and other governing officials. 
Direct legislation is typically sponsored by groups that form solely to support an 
initiative or referendum, and then disband after the electorate votes (Gerber, Lupia, and 
McCubbins, 2004; Lupia and Matsusaka, 2004). Because implementation is then 
delegated (often to multiple actors), and the group supporting the law has often dissolved, 
some degree of noncompliance is the norm, rather than the exception (Gerber, Lupia, and 
McCubbins, 2004).  Furthermore, the elected officials charged with the implementation 
of direct legislation are usually officials that previously blocked the legislation – direct 
legislation is costly and thus not the first avenue for policy reform, so those laws that are 
directly legislated are typically laws that would not be passed by the legislature (Gerber, 
1996, 1999). This means that the sorts of laws most likely to be passed as a result of 
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direct legislation are also the sorts of laws least likely to be implemented and enforced 
(Gerber, Lupia, and McCubbins, 2004). 
For example, consider California’s 1986 “English Only” initiative, which passed 
with 73% of the electorate’s vote, “made English the state’s official language and 
required state officials to ‘preserve and strengthen it” (California Secretary of State 1996, 
in Gerber, Lupia, and McCubbins, 2004, 43). A number of governing officials opposed 
the law and did little to enforce it. When a complaint was filed, the Attorney General 
“argued that Proposition 63 required only that official publications be made available in 
English, not that they be offered in English only” (Gerber, Lupia, and McCubbins, 2004, 
44).  So while direct legislation does damage minority interests, it is not clear that the 
institution does more damage than legislatures, particularly when direct legislation’s 
implementation problem is taken into account. 
Poor budgeting. Common knowledge might point to direct legislation’s perverse 
effects on the state budget, but the supposed “Californication” of state budgets has little 
empirical support (Matsusaka, 2005b). Since California has one of the oldest and oft-
employed institutions of direct legislation, and (uniquely among the states) prevents the 
legislature from altering initiative budgeting decisions, it would seem that if any state’s 
budget is likely to suffer from direct legislation, it would be California’s. However, 
Matsusaka (2005b) found that only a small percentage of California’s budget is actually 
spent on projects that would not have, without initiatives, been funded, and that restraints 
on taxes did not significantly constrain legislators’ ability to generate income. 
 Corporate influence. Another longstanding concern with direct legislation is the 
role of corporate interests. Progressive and Populist politicians envisioned direct 
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legislation as a tool for countering the influence of corporate interests, but it quickly 
became apparent that they would exert significant influence (Gerber, 1999; Smith and 
Tolbert, 2004). While corporate interests undoubtedly use direct legislation to further 
their interests, it is not clear that corporate interests profit more from direct legislation 
than they do from legislatures.  
Corporate interests have difficulty passing direct legislation because of their 
particular set of resources (Gerber, 1999), and because of the way voters vote (Lupia and 
Matsusaka, 2004). Business groups tend to be less credible, and have fewer volunteers, 
both of which are valuable resources when trying to pass a proposition (Gerber, 1999). 
Voters tend to vote “no” on direct legislation when it is not clear that new legislation is 
preferable to the status quo (Bowler and Donovan, 1998), so when citizens are confused 
by a ballot issue, or feel that they are lacking credible endorsements – which is more 
likely when business interests are attempting to pass direct legislation – voters are likely 
to reject the proposal (Lupia and Matsusaka, 2004). While business groups do have 
success opposing direct legislation, business groups say (and formal theory suggests) that 
the main reason they involve themselves with direct legislation is to send a signal to the 
legislature (Gerber, 1999).  
Unlike business groups, citizen groups have some success in passing direct 
legislation (Gerber, 1999; Boehmke, 2005). Broad-based citizen interests groups appear 
to be the most successful, as they have the resources most needed in direct legislation: a 
large number of volunteers, a large amount of money (Boehmke, 2005), and greater 
credibility with voters (Gerber, 1999). Citizen groups are most successful when there is 
already widespread support for their proposal – citizen groups usually do not have 
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enough money to alter the status quo (Lupia and Matsusaka, 2004). In short, direct 
legislation offers broad-based citizen groups a venue for policy change, and does not 
allow corporate groups to “buy” new legislation at the ballot box. 
 Voter competence. Again, the debates over whether voters are sufficiently capable 
of making legislative decisions dates back to direct legislation’s origins in the Progressive 
Era (Smith and Tolbert, 2004). Citizens often appear woefully uninformed (e.g., 
Campbell, Converse, Miller, and Stokes, 1960; Zaller, 1992), susceptible to the influence 
of business interests, unable to decipher ballots that are, often, quite complex, and unable 
to lean on the cues provide by elections (e.g, partisanship, the history of a candidate) (see 
Magleby, 1984, 1994, or Cronin, 1989, for a good overview of these problems).  
However, empirical scholarship has shown that voters are able to make 
knowledgeable decisions under many conditions, including campaigns involving well-
funded business interests and complex ballots (e.g., Lupia, 1992; Lupia, 1994; Lupia and 
McCubbins, 1998; Gerber and Lupia, 1999). Citizens are able to use “informational 
shortcuts,” and learn from reliable endorsements (Lupia, 1992; Lupia, 1994; Lupia and 
McCubbins, 1998). For example, in the 1988 California insurance campaigns – where 
insurance lobbyists spent over $65 million, and ballot propositions were both complex 
and confusing – Lupia (1994) demonstrated that shortcuts allowed less informed voters to 
emulated similarly situated, informed voters. And, as noted above, citizens do appear to 
vote “no” when they do not understand a proposition (Bowler and Donovan, 1998). 
Not only are problems with voter competence overstated, empirical research 
suggests direct legislation has slight “educative effects,” increasing voter turnout, 
particularly in low salience elections such as midterms, and among independents (Tolbert 
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and Smith, 2005; Donovan, Tolbert, and Smith, 2009); increasing confidence in 
government (Tolbert and Smith, 2004); and increasing political knowledge, through 
political campaigning (Tolbert and Smith, 2004), and direct legislation campaigns 
explicitly connected to electoral races (Tolbert and Smith, 2006).  
However, just because direct legislation appears no worse than legislatures in the 
areas of minority-harming legislation, poor budgeting, corporate influence, and voter 
competence, it does not follow that direct legislation is democratic. Empirical scholars 
largely employ the standard of congruence to evaluate direct legislation. 
 
The standard of congruence 
 The empirical literature looks for congruence between the people's preferences 
and policy outcomes: to the degree that policy outcomes are congruent with the people's 
preferences, democracy is said to have been achieved. According to this standard, direct 
legislation contributes to democracy. Empirical work has shown direct legislation to be a 
“‘median-reverting’ institution" (Lupia and Matsusaka, 2004). Direct legislation alters the 
behavior of the legislature (usually indirectly): threats of initiative can push the 
legislature towards the preferences of the median-voter (Gerber, 1999). The presence of 
initiatives has also been shown to increase the amount of legislation (Randolph, 2010), an 
observation consistent with the theory that direct legislation brings the legislature closer 
in line to the median voter (Matsusaka and McCarty, 2001). 
 The presence of direct legislation has also changed how interest groups lobby the 
legislature: as groups’ resources shift in response to the additional policy avenue of direct 
legislation, interests groups engage in more outside lobbying (Boehmke, 2005). (Outside 
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lobbying occurs when lobbyists use public opinion as a tool to influence legislators – so, 
for example, lobbyists might directly shape public opinion, or they might threaten 
legislators with grassroots pressure, Kollman, 1998). In states with robust direct 
legislation, the legislature is more influenced by the median voter (Boehmke, 2005).   
The particular institutional design of direct legislation – most notably the absence 
of party organization, which can cause legislators to deviate from the median voter – 
provides an alternative venue for policy advocates (Gerber, 1996). This suggests direct 
legislation can offer legislation congruent with the median voter's preferences that, 
without direct legislation, would not have become law. Empirical work supports this 
theory: direct legislation does create policies the legislature would, on its own, not enact. 
For example, 22 out of the 24 states with initiatives have term limit laws for legislators, 
while only 2 of the 26 states without initiatives do (Matsusaka, 2005a). And, initiatives 
states are more likely to have lower salaries for officials holding higher office than non-
initiative states (Matsusaka, 2005a). Initiatives also seem to produce more socially 
conservative policies (Gerber, 1999; Matsusaka, 2004; Bowler and Donovan, 2004), and 
alter fiscal policy, reducing both taxes and spending (Matsusaka, 2004). These policy 
trends might well reflect the preferences of a median voter positioned to the right of the 
legislature, as these trends in spending are not reflected in the direct legislation of the first 
half of the 20th century, or, recently, in more urban areas (Lupia and Matsusaka, 2004).  
 Because direct legislation disciplines the legislature and offers alternative 
legislation when elected officials stray from the median voter’s preferences, direct 
legislation has democratic value according to the standard of congruence. But the 
congruence standard is problematic from both empirical and normative perspectives.  
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Challenges to the congruence standard  
 The congruence standard is derived from a widespread model of democratic 
representation which some call the “mandate model” (Disch, 2011; Rosanvallon, 2008), 
others the “institutional” model (Urbinati, 2006), and (many) the principal-agent model. 
According to this notion, the people authorize officials – generally through elections – to 
govern in their interests. There are potentially two distinct standards for evaluating 
congruence in this model. One standard is the people’s will (what the people decide they 
want), and the other is people’s interest (what is best for the people).  
 The latter standard, that of the people’s interests, faces substantial democratic 
difficulties. It allows for the dismissal of citizen voice – citizens can be said not to 
“know” their own interest, or the interest of the whole. Perhaps the most infamous 
application of this standard is Edmund Burke’s theory of virtual representation. Burke 
believed representatives should listen to their constituents’ opinions. Yet, argued Burke, 
to think that such opinions are “authoritative instructions” or “mandates” is to 
misunderstand the job of a representative and the nature of the representative assembly, 
which is to deliberate among themselves, and to look to “one interest, that of the whole” 
([1774], 1856). Considering its easy dismissal of citizen voice, it is not surprising that 
virtual representation has a history of justifying exclusion – it was used to justify 
women’s lack of vote, for instance (Urbinati, 2006, 151). 
 More contemporary critiques of the standard of the people’s interest have feared 
“technocracy.” Consider, for example, Habermas’s critique of the scientization of politics 
and public opinion (1970). Insofar that the question of the people’s interests becomes a 
scientifically soluble problem – simply a question of research, knowledge, and 
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application – a “technocratic” regime is justifiable. However, as Habermas (following 
Weber) argues, such a regime is impossible: knowledge, particularly political knowledge, 
is never value-neutral. The technocratic model, then, is no different from a model in 
which officials simply choose “between competing value orders and convictions” (1970, 
63).  
 While concerns with references to the people’s interests are longstanding, 
concerns with the former standard of congruence – that of the people’s will – are on the 
rise. The people’s will, the supposed device for the authorization of elected officials, 
appears to be at least partially a product of the authorization process.26 Political 
psychologists conceive preferences as endogenous to politics (e.g., Bartels, 2003); 
legislative scholars model representation as a dynamic, also with endogenous preferences 
(e.g., Gerber and Jackson, 1993, Stimson, Mackuen, and Erikson, 1995); public opinion 
scholars study how frames construct preferences (e.g., Druckman, 2004); and historical 
institutionalists examine how institutions create preferences (e.g. Thelen, 2003).  
 On the normative side, feminist theorists have long challenged naturalizing 
categories of identity and interest, instead seeing them as constructs of political 
processes. For instance “women” is understood not as a prepolitical identity, but a 
construct useful for political organizing (Zerilli, 2005), or a “perspective” created by 
political processes over time (Young, 2000). Similarly, those working in the post-
structuralist tradition have understood meaning and coherence – including “the people” 
of a democracy – as constructs of practices (see Näsström, 2006, for an overview). This 
                                                
26 For a detailed explanation of these concerns, see Disch (2011). Disch traces this 
difficulty to Pitkin’s influential work on representation (1967). 
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undermining of the pre-political people’s will removes the “bedrock” upon which the 
empirical evaluations of direct legislation rely: if political processes construct the 
people’s will, then the standard of congruence between preferences and policy outcome is 
in inadequate indicator of democratic representation (Disch, 2011). 
 In sum, there are two problems with the standard of congruence. One is that 
congruence with the people’s interests is not, on its own, an obviously democratic 
measure. The second is with the unidirectional framework of authorization underlying the 
congruence standard: if political processes constitute the political decisions citizens 
make, then congruence’s ability to indicate authorization (and the authorization process 
itself) is suspect. Because of these problems, the standard of congruence offers an 
incomplete defense of direct legislation’s democratic character. 
 If empiricists are aware of (at least) some of the problems with the standard of 
congruence, one might wonder why it continues to be used. For one, there is no clear 
alternative. “The normative issues raised by endogenous preferences are larger and less 
tractable” than the empirical issues, concluded two scholars in a response typical of their 
field (Gerber and Jackson, 1993, p654). Many are aware of the difficulty, but (perhaps 
feeling such a problem is the domain of normative theorists) they usually simply note the 
issue and move on. Furthermore, the “mandate” or “institutional” model is notoriously 
difficult to avoid. While scholars have acknowledged its shortcomings, they nonetheless 
tend to revert to its normative framework (Disch, 2011).  
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A judgment-based evaluation 
 The normative standard of a judgment-based model is citizens’ judgment of 
governance, and the subject of evaluation is institutional design – whether institutions 
enable citizens’ judgment of governance. In certain cases, direct legislation enables 
citizen judgment on issues of governance that, without the institution, citizens would not 
have had the opportunity to judge.  
 Policy advocates typically turn to direct legislation only after failing to make 
progress in other venues (because direct legislation is so costly) (Gerber, 1999). Not all 
issues have equal access to the public’s judgment via direct legislation: reaching the 
public requires money, people, and credibility, which is why broad-based interest groups 
have the most success passing propositions (Gerber, 1999; Lupia and Matsusaka, 2004; 
Boehmke, 2005). In short, direct legislation allows the public to judge issues that both 
failed to reach the public via other venues – like the state legislature – and that are 
supported by broad-based interest groups.  
 For example, consider California’s 1988 insurance initiative campaigns. In the 
1980’s, Californians saw their auto insurance premiums escalate. The insurance 
companies blamed the lawyers, whose excessive litigiousness, they argued, caused the 
increase; the lawyers in turn blamed the auto insurance companies, arguing that lawsuits 
allowed citizens some control over the powerful insurance industry; and consumer 
activists pushed for lower rates and greater oversight of the industry (Lupia, 1994, 64-5). 
For five years, discussions for reform failed to proceed past legislative committee’s 
deliberations, deliberations that were dominated by the insurance and attorney interests 
(Lupia, 1994).  
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 In response to this legislative stalemate, and their own exclusion from the 
legislative process, consumer activists announced they would put a reform proposition on 
the 1988 ballot (Lupia, 1994, 64, n13). The auto insurance industry and attorneys’ lobby 
shortly followed the consumer activists’ proposal with their own propositions. Over $82 
million was spent over the course of the campaign, with the insurance lobby spending 
approximately $65 million; the attorneys, $15 million; and consumer activists, a little 
under $2 million. Despite the complexity of the issue, an ambiguous ballot, and the high 
amount of money spent on this campaign by the insurance industry, voters approved the 
initiative offered by consumer activists (albeit by a slim margin), and rejected those 
initiatives offered by the insurance industry and the attorneys (Lupia, 1994).  
 The insurance industry case is typical of direct legislation’s potential 
contributions. The “mythology” of direct legislation – that corporate interests determine 
outcomes, and that voters are confused by complex issues and ballots – proved false. 
Without direct legislation, citizens would not have had the opportunity to judge the issue 
of insurance reforms. Furthermore, it was not judgment on simply any issue that direct 
legislation enabled – insurance reform was pushed by broad-based interest groups with 
the resources to conduct a direct legislation campaign.  
 To be clear, a judgment-based model does not understand broad-based interest 
group support to be an indicator of democracy. This is different from the congruence 
standard, which understands broad-based interest group support to indicate an issue’s 
potential alignment with the median voter’s preferences. According to a judgment-based 
model, the value of direct legislation lies in the enablement of citizen judgment on issues 
that otherwise would not have come before the public. That only issues backed by broad-
 102 
based interest groups become objects of citizen judgment indicates the limits of direct 
legislation’s contributions. So, for very different reasons, the congruence standard and the 
judgment-based model would agree that the insurance reform case was an example of 
direct legislation contributing to a democratic system. Such agreement is not the case 
with all instances of direct legislation. Consider, for example, California’s Proposition 
187. 
 
Proposition 187 
 Proposition 187 was a 1994 initiative targeting illegal immigrant’s access to 
public resources. Known as the “Save our State” initiative, it removed access to a variety 
of public services, including public education and non-emergency health care. The 
initiative also required local officials to report suspected illegal immigrants to the INS. In 
the 1994 midterms, SOS passed with a remarkable level of voter support (59% for, 41% 
against) (Nicholson, 2005, 97). 
 According to the standard of congruence, and the “mandate” or “institutional” 
model of representation underlying it, there are no obvious problems with SOS and its 
passage. The standard of congruence is concerned with voters’ ability to express their 
preferences – either voters should be well-informed, or they should be able to rely on 
available cues. In the case of SOS, it would be hard to argue that voters lacked either 
information or cues. Ninety-one percent of voters were aware of the proposition, an 
incredibly high percentage (Nicholson, 2003, 406; Nicholson, 2005, 97), and forty 
percent of voters said the proposition was the most important issue in the midterms 
(despite their being both a gubernatorial race and U.S. senate race that year) (Lubenow, 
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1995, 124; Nicholson, 2005, 97). The ballot was not particularly complex, and there were 
plenty of reliable cues by endorsers: by the date of the vote, high-profile candidates on 
both sides of the aisle had either endorsed or rejected SOS. Furthermore, the fifty-nine 
percent passage rate reflected opinion polls over the course of the campaign (Nicholson, 
2005, 97). While such consistency in opinion is not proof of awareness and 
understanding, it is not consistent with a confusing campaign.  
 Granted, one could argue SOS was a violation of minority rights. But such threats 
to minorities are, as I noted above, relatively rare, and it is not clear that direct legislation 
is worse in this respect than other democratic institutions, like legislatures. Scholars 
employing the “mandate” or “institutional” model have argued that these occasional 
violations are not indicative of a democratic deficiency, but of the value of an 
authoritative, rights-protecting constitution (Lupia and Matsusaka, 2004).  Here, the 
constitution seems to have played precisely that role: most of the proposition was 
declared unconstitutional by a federal court. Although the state appealed, an agreement 
was eventually reached whereby all of SOS – with the exception of two minor provisions 
penalizing the production of false documents – were voided (McDonnell, 1999; Nieves, 
1999).  
 From the perspective of the standard of congruence, then, direct legislation played 
its democratic role as a median-reverting institution. Laws barring illegal immigrants 
from public benefits made little progress in the legislature, and the people were able to 
express their will directly with SOS. And when the will of the people violated minority 
rights, as it arguably did with SOS, the constitution prevented the law’s implementation. 
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 However, SOS is problematic from a judgment-based perspective. The SOS 
campaign did not give citizens the opportunity to judge an issue that, without the 
initiative, they would otherwise not have judged. The central institutional feature of direct 
legislation that allows it to be an alternative venue for policy advocates is its absence of 
party organization (Gerber, 1999). However, parties played an important role in the SOS 
campaign. When the interest group proposing SOS ran out of money, the Republican 
Party stepped in, and funded the campaign (Nicholson, 2005, 96). Furthermore, SOS was 
a central feature of the Republican gubernatorial campaign. SOS, then, became an issue 
not because it failed to gain traction in other policy arenas, but because Republicans 
recognized that SOS could be used as a wedge issue to influence concurrent campaigns 
(Nicholson, 2005).   
 The SOS case is not only an example of direct legislation not contributing to a 
democratic system, it also indicates problems direct legislation can introduce. In the SOS 
case, direct legislation was used to narrow the issues citizen judged. Public opinion work 
on voting helps us here. Integrating widely accepted literatures on priming, partisan 
stereotypes, and spillover effects, Nicholson (2005) shows that voters do not judge 
electoral or initiative issues in institutional isolation. Instead, voters “vote the agenda,” an 
agenda which reflects not the issues of one campaign, or the “institutional responsibility” 
of a specific office (like the duties of governor, for example), but the larger “political 
information environment” (Nicholson, 2005). 
  For example, a voter does not generally complete a ballot by methodically 
considering which qualifications different offices entail, and the issues discussed in the 
separate electoral campaigns (Nicholson, 2005). Rather, a voter considers the match 
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between her own position on salient issues, and what she knows of the candidates’ 
position (she will usually rely on partisan cues)  (Nicholson, 2005). The agenda of the 
larger political information environment consists of the most salient issues of the time; it 
is not the equivalent of what is listed on a ballot (Nicholson, 2005). 
 This public opinion work has important implications for a judgment-based model: 
when we consider whether an institution enables citizen judgment, we should look to the 
agenda of the political information environment – what I call the inter-institutional 
agenda – not to the content of any one ballot. Note that this perspectival shift does not 
change our prior evaluation of the California insurance case. In the California case, direct 
legislation did introduce the issue of insurance reform to the inter-institutional agenda, 
and in the SOS case, it still seems likely that direct legislation was not needed to 
introduce the issue. Also note that the distinction between decision and judgment is 
critical here. Californians were making decisions that would influence many issues of 
governance – they were casting votes not only for SOS, but also on their new governor, 
their new representative in the U.S. Senate, and many state and local representatives. But 
the inter-institutional agenda directed citizen judgment towards the single issue of SOS. 
If we disregard the space of citizen judgment – as the congruence standard does –we risk 
missing how institutional design might enable, or hinder, citizen agency.27  
                                                
27 We should also be skeptical of reliance on constitutional protections for minority 
rights. For one, the empirical claim that federal courts are countermajoritarian is widely 
questioned in the legal literature (for an overview, see Graber, 2008). For another, it is 
not clear how unelected justices’ voiding of popular decisions can be legitimated in a 
democratic system, particularly considering their oft-reliance on indeterminate doctrine 
(for an overview, see Waldron, 2006). The congruence standard’s need to turn to judicial 
elites suggests the other normative problem with the “mandate” or “institutional” model: 
justification can always be found by referencing the amorphous “whole people’s 
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The space of citizen judgment   
 We can understand governing institutions as constructing a space in which 
citizens judge. The concept of space is a useful way of thinking about institutions’ 
relation to judgment, as institutions’ effects are conditional, depending both on the 
particular citizen, and on other elements in the citizen’s immediate environment. Talking 
about the space of citizen judgment allows us to point to governing institutions’ potential 
influence on citizen judgment without implying that institutions determine citizen 
judgment. 
 How do institutions construct this space? Here, I have pointed to one important 
way – through the creation of an inter-institutional agenda, institutions structure the 
objects of citizen judgment. With SOS, citizens’ judgment was directed towards one issue 
of governance, despite citizens casting votes for many different electoral offices. With the 
California insurance initiative, citizens’ judgment was directed towards an issue of 
governance that, without the initiative, they would not have judged. We can thus 
understand the enablement of citizen judgment on objects of governance as one means by 
which institution foster (or hinder) citizen agency. 
 Not only do institutions structure the objects of citizen judgment, institutions also 
effect which considerations (or beliefs or values) citizens apply in judgment. Public 
opinion work is again helpful, here. The public opinion literature conceives a particular 
mental act of judgment as an “attitude” – for example, a citizen is expressing an attitude 
when they say a hate-group rally should not be legally prohibited (Chong and Druckman, 
                                                                                                                                            
interests.” The people authorize governing officials to act in their interest as a whole, and 
the “whole people’s interest” – here, the protection of minority rights – can be called 
upon to override the people’s expressed preferences.  
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2007).28 Particular attitudes are a product of the mental activity of combining “object 
evaluations” with “salience weights” (Chong and Druckman, 2007). In the hate-group 
rally example, object evaluations might include the rally’s consequence on free speech, 
and on public safety; salience weights would be the degree to which those object 
evaluations influenced an individual’s attitude (Chong and Druckman, 2007; Nelson, 
Clawson, Oxley, 1997).  For instance, an individual might have a positive evaluation of 
the rally’s effect on free speech, and a negative evaluation of the rally’s effect on public 
safety, but if it does not occur to him to consider public safety (a zero salience weight), 
then his attitude on the rally would be wholly determined by his free speech beliefs. The 
considerations determining an individual’s attitude – here, his free speech beliefs – are 
considered his “frame in thought” (Chong and Druckman, 2007).  
 The inter-institutional agenda can influence citizen judgment by affecting these 
frames in thought. For example, a comparative study of the 2006 elections shows that the 
presence of a minimum-wage initiative changed the considerations citizens applied in 
forming their particular judgments. The initiative increased the salience of the economy; 
increased support for Democratic candidates; and altered voters’ perception of the policy, 
with Democrats more likely to support increases in minimum-wage, and Republicans less 
(Smith and Tolbert, 2010). These findings are consistent with previous work on the 
                                                
28 The concept of “judgment” is inordinately slippery because it can reference at least 
three different things: (1) a faculty or a capacity, (2) a type of mental activity, or (3) a 
particular mental act. For example, a court judge might be said to have (the capacity of) 
judgment, do work that involves (the activity of) judgment, and to regularly offer 
(particular) judgments. 
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effects of ballot campaigns, as well as research on issue priming and partisan priming 
(see Nicholson, 2005, Chapter 2).29  
 Problematically, public opinion work has shown that when citizens are presented 
with only one  set of considerations – as opposed to competing considerations –  most 
follow the considerations most recently presented to them. When citizens form a 
particular judgment, they appeal to those considerations that are both accessible and 
strong (Chong and Druckman, 2007a, 105, 111). For example, citizens are more likely to 
be tolerant of a hate rally if they are presented with a news story framing it as free speech 
issue, not a public safety issue (Nelson, Clawson, Oxley, 1997). Such framing effects can 
occur even when the frames are “logically equivalent” (Druckman, 2004). However, the 
ability of an elite-provided frame to determine an individual’s attitude is mediated if 
competing frames are offered concurrently (Sniderman and Theriault, 2004; Chong and 
Druckman, 2007b; Chong and Druckman, 2010). 
 These findings suggest that a narrowing of the inter-institutional agenda is not 
only problematic because it reduces the objects of citizen governance, but also because it 
reduces competition among frames (the considerations applied in judgment). A collapsed 
inter-institutional agenda makes it more likely that many citizens’ judgments are a 
function of which frame they last heard, loudest.  The collapsing of the space of citizen 
judgment thus hinders citizen agency in two ways: it reduces the objects of governance 
citizens are likely to judge, and it makes the content of citizen judgment an effect of a 
                                                
29 In the psychological model I summarized here, priming and framing describe similar 
processes (Chong and Druckman, 2007a, 115). 
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frame’s ability to dominate discourse (an ability that is independent of the truth of the 
frame, Chong and Druckman, 2007a, 111).   
 We can pick out several features of direct legislation that narrowed the space of 
citizen judgment in the SOS case. For one, simply that direct legislation and electoral 
campaigns are placed on the same ballot contributes to the narrowing of citizen space for 
judgment. Concurrent campaigns enable “spillover effects,” and allowed candidates to 
explicitly link their campaigns to the initiative campaign, as Pete Wilson did with SOS, in 
his successful run for governor. Furthermore, institutional design allows such concurrent 
campaigns to be run in low-information elections: the priming and spillover effects of 
initiatives are greater in low-information elections, like midterms (Nicholson, 2005; 
Donovan, Tolbert, and Smith, 2008; Smith and Tolbert, 2010). Such single-issue 
domination of the inter-institutional agenda might well be impossible in a presidential 
election year. 
 Campaign finance laws are a second institutional feature that allowed for the 
narrowing of the space of citizen judgment. Campaign finance laws provided incentives 
to political strategists to use direct legislation to narrow the inter-institutional agenda. 
Until the recent Citizens United (2010) decision, direct legislation’s finance laws were 
markedly different from election finance laws: in direct legislation, there are no limits on 
campaign spending, and no specific limitations on corporations or unions. Political 
strategists recognize that direct legislation campaigns presents a loophole in election law, 
and have explicitly used its relaxed financing restrictions to influence elections (Smith 
and Tolbert, 2004; Garret and Smith, 2005; Tolbert and Smith, 2006). Now that Citizens 
United has relaxed legal restrictions on election campaign financing, it is not clear that 
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direct legislation will continue to be such a significant target for “soft-money.” That said, 
it seems rash to assume electoral campaigns will no longer utilize direct legislation, given 
its past value (Nicholson, 2005). 
 Finally, if we combine the two above features – concurrent campaigns and 
campaign finance laws – with a third – party organization – we see how the institutional 
design provides incentives for the use of “wedge” issues. Partisans’ strategic targeting of 
direct legislation to influence electoral outcomes suggests that one particular set of issues 
are likely to dominate the inter-institutional agenda, when direct legislation produces 
such domination: “wedge” issues. Partisans use wedge issues to map themselves and their 
electoral opponents onto an issue; the issue is chosen to generate votes. Wedge issues are 
(by definition) chosen to reduce the inter-institutional agenda to one issue. The most 
effective wedge issues are “highly emotive issues” that are “widely supported, especially 
by voters who ordinarily would not vote”; “easily understood”; and automatically 
associated with one or more parties (Nicholson, 93, 2005). In American politics, race has 
long met all these requirements, making it the “quintessential wedge issue”; in this way, 
SOS, with its racial overtones (made explicit in some advertisements), was paradigmatic 
(Nicholson, 93, 2005). But other issues can be used as wedge issues as well – some argue 
LGBT rights have recently been used as wedge issues.30  
 In sum, features of inter-institutional design – concurrent campaigns, finance 
laws, and party organization – provide incentives to partisans to narrow the inter-
institutional agenda to one issue, likely a wedge issue. In cases like SOS, the institutional 
                                                
30 See Campbell and Monson (2008), Becker and Scheufele (2009), and Freedman (2004) 
for discussions of this debate.  
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design narrows the space of citizen judgment. Note that institutional context was different 
in the 1988 California insurance campaign. In the 1988 campaign, funding came from 
interest groups (insurance lobbies, attorney lobbies, and citizen consumer groups), not 
partisan interests (Lupia, 1994). And the anti-reform groups did not want to be associated 
with their ads, purposefully distancing the issue from any sort of reference groups (Lupia, 
1994, 66). Partisan cues were not available (Lupia, 1994), reducing the likelihood of 
spillover effects. Furthermore, it was a presidential election year, making it more difficult 
– the literature suggests it might well be impossible – for a direct legislation issue to 
dominate the inter-institutional agenda (Nicholson, 2005; Donovan, Tolbert, and Smith, 
2008; Smith and Tolbert, 2010). Certainly, the success of the insurance reform initiative 
did not produce sweeping results for Democrats – Bush narrowly won California that 
year. 
 A judgment-based model points to institutional reforms that the congruence 
standard has already recommended, like placing caps on contributions to direct 
legislation campaigns. But it also points to new institutional reforms. A judgment-based 
model suggests direct legislation should be divorced from electoral campaigns. Initiatives 
might be placed on separate ballots from electoral campaigns. Also, partisan use of 
wedge issues might be limited by restricting party’s donations to initiative campaigns – 
recall that the SOS initiative would have run out of funding if the Republican party had 
not stepped in with its donation (Nicholson, 2005, 96). Because direct legislation is so 
costly, individual candidates do not typically use wedge issues, but parties do, as both the 
cost and benefits are spread out over a number of candidates (Nicholson, 2005, 93).  
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Conclusion   
 In this chapter, I began developing an alternative model for the evaluation of 
contemporary institutions of mass democratic politics. Institutions’ enablement of citizen 
judgment should be used as a measure of democracy. Specifically, we should consider 
how institutions structure the space of citizen judgment, worrying when institutional 
design constrains that space, and looking for institutional features that create and 
maintain it. A narrow space reduces the objects of governance that citizens judge, and 
makes citizen judgment more likely to be a function of a frame’s ability to dominate the 
communication environment.  
 Certainly, in cases like SOS, it is not only direct legislation that is the problem; 
rather, the difficulties lie in the manner which direct legislation functions in conjunction 
with other institutions. A full analysis of a democratic system must pay close attention to 
inter-institutional relations. Further work should consider how other institutions structure 
judgment. As successful propositions are circulated among institutions, citizens may 
continue to judge the issue. The continued circulation of judgment does not reduce or 
alter the democratic “effects” of judgments that came earlier – as I explained above, a 
judgment-based model understands judgment itself to be a form of political agency, so no 
outcome can negate its democratic “effect”31 – but it does suggest further subjects of 
study.  
 
 
                                                
31 With the exception of the removal of that which gives judgment power – here, 
suffrage. 
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Chapter 5 
Conclusion 
 
  Institutions “structure”: by definition, an institution is a set of constraints that, by 
constraining, generates particular patterns of behavior, including ways of thinking. In this 
dissertation, I asked, how do governing institutions structure judgment? Might governing 
institutions contribute to the production of good judgment, and if so, how? To answer 
these questions, I developed a dynamic concept of judgment, relying heavily on the idea 
of a reflective equilibrium. I suggested that judgment is a process that occurs over time, 
and occurs among and between institutions and individuals. I developed a standard for 
evaluating this procedural notion of judgment, and called this standard good judgment. I 
then applied this standard to the analysis of two U.S. institutions, direct legislation and 
the judiciary. I noted features in both institutions that contribute to collective processes of 
good judgment; I also noted the limits of these institutions’ contributions. I found that the 
capacity of institutions to contribute to collective processes of judgment formation 
depended not only on an institution’s particular design, but also on an institution’s 
location in a larger system of institutions.  
Once we understand the construction of good judgment to depend not only on the 
features of any one particular institution, but also on the dynamics of inter-institutional 
relations, the door is opened to rethinking the degree to which good judgment is a 
function of democratic politics. First, though, what do I mean when by “judgment as a 
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function of democratic politics”?  I refer to a tradition that understands judgment – good 
or bad – to be a product of an institution’s relation to democracy, particularly mass 
democracy. Some understand democracy to generate good judgment. For example, 
Waldron (1995) argues that Aristotle offers a “doctrine of the wisdom of the multitude”: 
the deliberation of a heterogeneous community can produce something that is not only 
greater than the parts on their own, but also greater than its simple aggregate.  
More commonly, it seems, is the argument that democracy is – in one way or 
another – antagonistic to good judgment. For example, consider Hamilton’s famous 
argument for judicial review in The Federalist Papers. Hamilton claimed the judiciary’s 
judgment is characterized by its “integrity and moderation”: because of this particular 
capacity – one which depends, it seems, on its insulation from mass democracy by its life 
tenure – the judiciary should be given the power to “moderate” and “check” “the 
occasional ill humors” of legislatures (Federalist 78, 477).  There are echoes of 
Hamilton’s arguments in contemporary discourse, particularly those who defend judicial 
review and life tenure for justices, and argue against judicial elections. For example, 
Dworkin (1999) argues that the maintenance of the fundamental rights on which 
democracy depends requires the existence of a judiciary insulated from mass politics. 
Or, consider the tradition that understands good judgment to be largely a function 
of the right conditions for discourse. For example, Canada’s new Citizens’ Assemblies – 
one in British Columbia, and one in Ontario – are quickly becoming models of not only 
democratic deliberation, but also the production of good judgment. Both were created 
through legislative order, and consisted of (mostly) randomly selected citizens who were 
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assigned to debate one issue: evaluating their province’s electoral system.32 The small 
size of these assemblies, the random selection of their members, and debate’s restriction 
to a single-issue, appeared to create near-ideal conditions for deliberation (Warren, 2008). 
Discussion was structured to focus wholly on the issue at hand, there were no 
constituency pressures or incentives for strategic advancement, and resources were 
provided to citizens in order that they might learn their not-so-straightforward subject of 
electoral system design (Warren, 2008). The conclusion these assemblies produced – 
considered and practical recommendations for electoral reform – have been properly 
touted as examples of the good judgment “regular” citizens can produce, given the proper 
conditions for discourse (Warren and Pearse, 2008). Or consider Lessig, who is trying to 
organize a series of constitutional conventions similar in form to the Citizens’ 
Assemblies. Lessig hopes that once the public recognizes the “good sense” 
recommendations such citizen assemblies can generate, a citizen assembly will be 
established for rewriting the U.S. constitution (2011, 303).   
This dissertation’s shift away from evaluating judgment according to the output of 
any one particular institution – like the recommendation of a citizen assembly, or the 
opinion of a court – complicates the claim that quality of judgment is largely a function 
of an institution’s expression of, or insulation from, democratic politics.  That the relation 
between good judgment and democracy is more complex is apparent in the U.S., where 
                                                
32 Both Assemblies have their own websites with basic information and histories, and 
links to referendum information. For British Columbia, created in 2003, see, 
http://www.citizensassembly.bc.ca/public. For Ontario, created in 2006, see 
http://www.citizensassembly.gov.on.ca/en-CA/About.html. Both were relatively small 
(160 citizens in BC, and 103 citizens in ON). Other provinces were considering similar 
changes at the time, but did not use Citizens’ Assemblies (Pilon, 2010). 
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the system of governance disperses overlapping powers among institutions that are 
widely recognized as democratic (like referendums) and institutions that are not (like the 
judiciary). In a complex system like the U.S. (or Canada), it is hard to make the empirical 
claim that any one institution’s decision is final; this suggests that judgment is better 
conceived as a process over time, rather than the outcome of any one decision. The 
Canadian Citizens’ Assemblies example is illustrative, here. While the Assemblies did 
offer great insight into how an institution might be designed to generate good judgment, 
it is also the case that the recommendation of the Assemblies were never put into effect 
because their recommendations were voted down in popular referendums (Warren and 
Pearse, 2008).33 
This dissertation’s analysis of inter-relatedness of institutions suggests, then, that 
good or bad judgment should not be sought in the output of any one institution. The 
empirical reality of U.S. inter-institutional dynamics motivates this claim, but it is worth 
noting that Urbinati (2006) identifies this very lack of finality as a key characteristic of 
democratic institutions. The lack of a final decision, she argues, enables the circulation of 
judgment (e.g., the right of repeal in Condorcet’s proposed constitution, 214-7). And 
when a decision cannot be repealed – Urbinati argues this is the case with judicial 
decisions (2006, 127) – the processes of collective judgment cease. Following Urbinati’s 
insight on the importance of repeal, this dissertation’s analysis of the U.S. judiciary 
shows how those acts that commonly travel under the label of “implementation failure” – 
acts like, Hawaii’s constitutional referendum nullifying the Baehr decision allowing 
                                                
33 To be clear, this is not intended as a criticism of Warren and Pearse (2008), whose 
collected edition on the Citizens’ Assemblies also included a study of the referendum. 
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same-sex marriage, or the referendum rejecting the Assemblies’ recommendation – might 
be re-conceived as moments in a larger process of collective judgment. That no one 
institution has the ability to make final, authoritative decisions is not the only 
complication of that tradition that attaches good judgment to particular institutions, and 
diagnosing that good judgment as a function of the institution’s relation to democratic 
politics (particularly mass democratic politics). 
 As my chapter on direct legislation illustrated, it is also the case that judgment 
occurs in an environment informed and by multiple institutions. When citizens vote on a 
referendum, for instance, they do not do so an information environment only structured 
by the institution of direct legislation. If referendums are concurrent with electoral 
campaigns – as they almost always are – such campaigns alter the so-called “information 
environment,” and also help structure citizens’ referendum votes. Furthermore, as my 
analysis of direct legislation showed, it is not simply that electoral campaigns influence 
voting decisions: political actors are well aware of the complicated environment, and 
strategically employ direct legislation campaigns to gain advantages in elections. 
 This being the case, does it make sense to condemn the mass politics of direct 
legislation as the source of bad judgment (whether one uses a procedural standard such as 
this dissertation’s, or a substantive, outcome-based standard)? My direct legislation 
chapter suggested that it does not. Although certain features of direct legislation might 
have made it culpable in the past – features such as no caps on campaign donations – the 
rules that governed inter-institutional relations – such as concurrent ballots – were, I 
argued, equally if not more responsible for problems with judgment. 
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Finally, in identifying features of institutional design that contributed to (or 
diminished) good collective judgment, this dissertation develops insights of the 
“constructivist turn” in democratic theory (described by Disch, 2011). The constructivist 
turn challenges those theories that ground good judgment in individual capacities, and 
suggests that judgment is always a collective process. While, as Disch (2011) explains, 
the collective character of this process erodes “the bedrock” of one theory of democratic 
representation – that which evaluates representation according to responsiveness to 
citizens preferences, and so requires preferences to be exogenously formed – it also 
suggests that democratic citizens need not be the perfect judges we know them not to be. 
This dissertation has shown how some of the burden for good judgment can be shifted 
from individuals to the design of governing institutions. 
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